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MUNICIPAL BOUNDARIES AND ZONING:
CONTROLLING REGIONAL LAND DEVELOPMENT*
DAVID M. BECKERt
The twentieth century in the United States has marked the transition
from essentially a rural society to an urban one. The bulk of the population
is now clustered in and around metropolitan areas. In the twenty years
which have elapsed since the end of World War II, the urbanization of
America can best be seen in the substantial growth and development of the
suburbs.' The rapid and almost endless sprawl of suburbia has marked the
mushroomed growth of outlying rural villages, the emergence of entirely
new communities, and the proliferation of corporate boundaries and govern-
mental units.2 The development of the metropolis and its progeny has
O The research for this article was conducted under a grant from the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration to Washington University, NASA Research Grant
NsG-342.
t Assistant Professor of Law, Washington University.
I. The 1960 urban population of the United States was 125.3 million, an increase
of 29% over 1950's 96.8 million. Of the urban population, 112.8 million resided
within Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas, (SMA's), areas in and nearby
central cities, 58 million lived within the central cities, and the balance of 54.8
million lived outside them.
During 1950-1960 the central cities grew some 10.8% in population. This growth
was concentrated in a small number of Southern and Western cities. Much of it
resulted from annexation. Most central cities lost population. During the same 10
years in areas within SMA's but outside of central cities there was a 48.5% increasein poulation ....These statistics indicate immense present growth in the suburban areas surround-
in central cities. Demographers predict that there will be no appreciable change in
this pattern.... Heyman & Gilhool, The Constitutionality of Imposing Increased
Community Costs On New Suburban Residents Through Subdivision Exactions, 73
YALE L. J. 1119 n.I (1964).
2. The fastest growing county in the United States, Brevard County, Florida, serves as
an excellent example of this phenomenon despite the fact that the enormity of such
growth undoubtedly is due to the presence of the Space Center and related activities and
is unlikely to be repeated. During the period between 1950 and 1960, Brevard County's
population increased by 371.1%. In 1940 its population was 16,142; 1950-23,653;
and in 1960-111,435. It was estimated that its population in 1964 would be 175,258; by
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aggravated old and precipitated new problems of alarming magnitude
which are too often lost in the shuffle of such urbanization.' Suburbs have
had to reckon with enormous increases in demands for schools, police and
fire protection, and water and sanitation facilities.4 They have had to con-
July 1967-210,000; and by 1970 it is believed the population will range from 230,000 to
270,000. See NELSON, EAST CENTRAL FLORIDA PROFILE 11, 15 (1964).
Since 1950, this county has undergone a dramatic change in development. It had
been largely rural in character with several fishing and tourist villages. It has since be-
come a county of young suburbanites (median age 26.4) marked by urban growth and
sprawl. Strangely enough this has occurred in the absence of a core city; as of 1960 none
of the communities exceeded a population of 20,000. See Green, Urban Growth in the
Nation's Spaceport 4-5 (1964) (unpublished report in Washington University Law
School Library). Most of the county's population is now located in its sixteen incorpor-
ated and twenty-nine unincorporated communities. Residents of these communities are
subject to the following additional local governmental units-school district, Central and
Southern Florida Flood Control District, mosquito district; and to one or more of the
following-port authority, hospital authority, airport authority, road and bridge district,
navigation district, drainage district and recreation district. Eleven of the incorporated
communities are clustered in south Brevard County. Some of the recent growth has been
reflected by a merger of several communities. See Green, supra at 3, 5. For the most
part, the urban growth has been scattered with some concentration of development,
especially commercial, along highways. Such pattern of development has reinforced the
tendency for new development to sprawl.
3. [I]n the last decade there has blossomed a phenomenon, not new but only
slightly apparent until recently-the scattering of development hither and yon
throughout the countryside.
This scattered growth has an enormous, seemingly disastrous effect on the until-
now rural municipality which must provide services for the new residents, many of
whom moved from the city and expect urban services in a rural climate. These
types of problems occur: Each school district must provide an education for all
children living within the district; neither of two developments of, say, one hundred
homes each located in the same school district a mile apart, separated by open
fields, is large enough to have its own elementary school; thus, bus transportation
must be provided to the children in one and in sometimes both developments. A
development of two hundred homes with 10,000 square-foot lots has on-lot sewage
disposal units for each home, a borough a mile away has a public sewerage system
which cannot be utilized because that system is used to capacity now and the cost of
expansion plus laying a trunk line to the development would be prohibitive in cost.
A farmer sells fifteen lots along the road to various individuals who build their own
homes; but increased traffic upon what were once rural roads requires increased
maintenance, the new residents request and obtain better police protection, and the
new children crowd into the old two-room school; the result is higher township and
school taxes because the tax return from the fifteen new houses is insufficient to pay
for the increased costs of local government. Hallman, Growth Control: A Proposal
For Handling Scattered Metropolitan Development, 33 LAND ECON. 80-81 (1957).
4. Brevard County, Florida, has had to face all of these problems, particularly that of
water and sanitation.
The present condition of water and sewage services in Brevard County leaves
much to be desired. A great part of these services has been met by private utility
companies that have small plants and limited perspectives of adequate sanitation
needs. There is ample evidence to suggest that some of these companies are not
maintaining the same standards as the municipalities in providing these services.
A citizens committee on sanitation has reported that of thirty-four sewage
treatment plants in the county, twenty-four operate without supervision and with
unknown results. These facilities are grossly inadequate since an estimated 50 per
cent of all housing units in the county have septic tanks. Furthermore, there are
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tend with entirely new transportation problems caused by the heretofore
unexperienced commuter traffic of antiquated and inadequate rural high-
ways.' Such growth has been neither efficient nor ordered; it has been
haphazard. Locational decisions have been made without regard to result-
ing community costs or the conse-vation and maximum use of important
land resources. The absence of adequ'ate regulation has caused the cumula-
sixty-four public water supplies that receive only minimal supervision. An estimated
9,000 homes obtain their water from private wells that are subject to surface
pollution. Green, supra note 2, at 7.
For a dramatic illustration of the growth of public schools in Brevard County and the
entire East Central Florida Region see NELSON, op. cit. supra note 2, at 35-36.
For a statement of the typical problems confronting a suburban community affected by
rapid growth see Christine Bldg. Co. v. City of Troy, 367 Mich. 508, 116 N.W.2d 816
(1962); Gruber v. Mayor & Township Comm., 68 N.J. Super. 118, 172 A.2d 47 (L.
1961), rev'd, 73 N.J. Super. 120, 179 A.2d 145 (App. Div.), aff'd, 39 N.J. 1, 186 A.2d
489 (1962).
In the Gruber case, the town grew from a population of 2763 in 1950 to 15,287 in
1960, with most of the increase occurring between 1958 and 1960. Such growth left
the township with serious fiscal and educational problems which necessitated regulation of
further development. The Christine Bldg. Co. case concerned the legality of a regulation
adopted by a community in anticipation of impending growth sanitation problems.
5. Perhaps the least soluble of all the problems of urban growth confronting Brevard
County is that of transportation. Invariably as in the case of Brevard County, growth
and development occur in the absence of an adequate public transportation system which
is required for the satisfaction of the commuting needs of new residents. Commuting is
thus nearly always done by automobile. The stress placed upon existing highways is
enormous. For an illustration of the increase in the annual average of daily traffic at
specific intersections between 1953 and 1963, see NELSON, op. cit. supra note 2, at 34
(At the intersection of "U.S. AIA S. of SR 520," daily traffic measured 855 in 1950, and
23,440 in 1963.) These highways were not designed for such increased traffic. Rush
hour traffic jams have become commonplace; one causeway has been described as the
"car strangled spanner." Green, supra note 2, at 11. (Emphasis added.)
There is also another dimension to this transportation problem. Highways constitute
over 25% of all developed land. Ibid. They not only provide a means of transportation,
but they also affect the land use patterns of areas proximate to such highways. Conversely,
these land use patterns affect the capacity of roads to transport residents to and from
work. For example, insoluble traffic bottlenecks are inevitable so long as intensive open-
access, strip commercial and residential development are permitted in uncontrolled
fashion. Thus, new and improved highways cannot solve increased traffic problems with-
out a corresponding control of new private development.
6. The past thirty years have provided us with countless examples in which un-
controlled land development outside the boundaries of cities has stultified proper
street development when population finally reached the place where integration
with the nearby community was required. Is it unreasonable to say that the city
planners, looking forward to the day of nearly inevitable integration, should be
entitled to lay out an adequate street system and require that land development take
cognizance of the forseeable needs? Land development necessarily affects the
population density of the region. Must a city, already groaning under the tax load
made necessary by supplying the schools and parks which were forgotten in the
past, stand idly by while nearby land is developed so intensively that the problems .of
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tion of neighboring, inharmonious land uses and furthered, in an effort to
avoid such discord, developmental sprawl and the indiscriminate usurpation
of what is no longer an unlimited land supply.' The foregoing are problems
which have been experienced by nearly all of the burgeoning regions under-
going urban growth as well as nearly all of their member communities. Not
only do such communities share this common experience, but also they
invariably share the same problems which pervade the entire metropolitan
area without recognition of or regard for local corporate limits.' Such
providing education and recreation facilities will be magnified when the region be-
comes politically integrated?
You have perhaps witnessed the spectacle of having the very best farm land near
a community transformed into a housing development because of the immediate
monetary rewards which such development afforded, while other available land
which is either of marginal value for agricultural purposes or completely unusable
for that purpose was left idle, although it would have been entirely useful for
housing development....
Or perhaps you have observed instances where the best possible industrial sites
have been consumed by premature residential development. And I am sure you have
seen instances where magnificent potential recreational areas otherwise unavailable,
have been destroyed by an alternative development. Is it not time, perhaps, that we
extend our sights a bit more into the future and provide the means by which we can
insure that our great land resources will be fully exploited in the production of
goods and services for the people of the nation? Smith, The Dilemma Faced By
Municipalities In Controlling Nearby Land Developments, 40 NEB. L. REV. 318,
323-24 (1960).
7. Once residences are established in the suburbs, other urban elements follow.
Industries follow to avoid heavy metropolitan taxes, as do various businesses estab-
lished to serve the new area. Such suburban expansion without adequate zoning
control has three serious consequences.
First, residences, retail business, and industry settle in the same areas causing in-
stability in property values, especially residential property. This condition is often
undesirable to residents, who then move on to new suburbs, consuming still more
land and re-establishing the entire pattern.
Second, the pattern of these developments usually takes place along main high-
ways or county roads decreasing their capacity by causing congestion and increasing
road hazards. This ribbon pattern creates widespread urban "sprawl" and results
in public expense in the relocation of highways.
Finally, and probably most significant to the rural areas, suburban expansion not
only absorbs a large quantity of land, but also the "flattest, least erodible, and most
fertile farm lands." While the total number of acres absorbed per year may not ap-
pear significant, the percentage of productive farm land lost in the same period is
substantial. In this connection, it should be noted that once agricultural land is
engulfed by suburban growth it is effectively irretrievable and the feasibility of re-
storing it to agricultural use is virtually nonexistent. Comment, 44 NEB. L. Rv.
151, 164-65 (1965).
8. Community interdependence can be illustrated in two different ways. First, neither
the core city nor suburbs are self sufficient. They are dependent. The core city must
frequently look to outlying areas "to find an adequate water supply and suitable loca-
tions for hospitals, correctional institutions, parks, sewage disposal works, and other
amenities." Anderson, The Extraterritorial Powers of Cities, 10 MINN. L. Rav. 475
(1926). Moreover,
if fringe areas were serviced by sewer and water systems, operated independently
of the core city's systems, the inhabitants of the fringe would find such conditions
economically intolerable. There are few fringe areas which are capable df sustain-
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problems for the most part do, and ought to, reflect the presence of a mutual
concern and interest among the affected communities. Their mutual inter-
dependence is a fact which is inescapable.
It should be apparent that the aforementioned problems thrive best in an
atmosphere of unmitigated freedom of choice in the use and development
of land.' It should also be clear that these are matters which do not dis-
appear by themselves." Public solutions are essential; inertia and indiffer-
ence are luxuries which cannot be afforded. 1 Since at the heart of most of
ing an adequate health, fire, or police department. SENGSTOcK, EXTRATERRITORIAL
PowEas IN THE METROPOLITAN AREA 3 (1962).
Additionally, many of the problems these communities face cannot be circumscribed by
geographical boundaries. Disease can infest an area in total disregard of city limits.
This is also true of problems generated by crime and inadequate police protection, out-
moded highways and increased traffic, fire hazards and insufficient protection, drought
and nonexistent control of water supply, and unemployment caused by the absence or
lack of much needed industry. In the main, these problems when they exist plague an
entire area. It should also be noted that the growth of suburbia invariably places a tre-
mendous strain upon the ability of communities to supply adequate public facilities and
services. The additional tax revenue derived from intensive urbanization is seldom
sufficient to offset the increased costs of supplying such services and facilities. The
absorption of such residential growth-finding decent places for people to live-is the
burden of the entire area. It does not become a local problem for others to contend with
simply because some communities elect to close their doors to all low cost residential
development.
9. Something less than astute observation in almost any of the nation's cities should
convince even the most skeptical that planning is desirable. A great many mumci-
palities are conglomerates of slums, crazy-quilt street systems, and multiple-deck
sandwiches of apartment buildings, small houses, industries, and businesses situated
without rhyme or reason. The approaches to many cities, large and small, are
nightmares of irresponsibility. Drive-ins, small businesses, and industries of all types
line the highways: many of them are either architectural monstrosities or one-
story, paint-peeling shacks. In any case, they not only detract immeasurably from
the attractiveness of the highway and retard future development, but in many in-
stances they also create serious health and safety hazards. These factors--and they
constitute only a few of the problems-can be prevented by rational planning and
zoning. They cannot be prevented without planning and zoning. Bartelt, Extra-
territorial Zoning: Reflections on its Validity, 32 NoTRE DAME LAW. 367, 370-71
(1957).
10. See Green, supra note 2, at 5-11. Green notes that the problems which confront
Brevard County have arisen in default of any attempts to make deliberate land-use
decisions. It is suggested that these are problems which cannot be resolved so long as
important land-use decisions are made by default. It is imperative that institutional pro-
cedures be developed and applied with respect to decisions concerning the local develop-
ment of land.
11. Raw land is basically a national resource which is to be exploited to provide
various kinds of values for our society. It must provide locations for residences; it
must provide locations for industry and commerce; it must provide food for our
society; it must provide mineral exploitation; it must provide recreational areas;
and it must provide areas for the variety of public uses of land which we now deem
essential to our society-roads, city halls, school buildings, and various other com-
munity facilities.
The question is: How is the land to be allocated to insure the maximum ex-
ploitation to meet those needs? Shall it be done exclusively at the will of the owner,
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these problems is a private decision respecting the kind and manner of use
to which land will be put, it would seem that the formulation of public
solutions would at least necessitate adequate planning and the imposition of
land use controls-particularly zoning. 2 The control of rapid urbanization
of a region by the exercise of the police power is fraught with problems as
or shall organized society play a part, with resultant restrictions upon the freedom
of choice which the landowner may assert? The fact is, of course, that particular
development of any piece of land has an impact upon society as a whole, and the
interests of society are entitled to at least minimum recognition.
Smith, supra note 6, at 322-23.
12. It should be obvious that not all of the problems of rapid urban growth reflect
decisions regarding the use of land. Nor can it be said that the regulation of land use is
the sole or ultimate solution to the many problems of urbanization. Nonetheless, one can
affirm the fact that decisions respecting the timing, location and content of private de-
velopment bear directly upon the magnitude of the problems confronted by suburbia and
the matter of promoting orderly and adequate community growth.
Land use locational and content decisions indeed do affect the feasibility of providing
and administering adequate public facilities and services. Strip or corridor, commercial
and residential development create traffic problems which are virtually incapable of
solution as well as add to the costs of serving such development. Scattered, leapfrog
development of outlying areas, by unnecessarily enlarging the service area, substantially
increases the cost of supplying adequate water and sanitation facilities, police and fire
protection, school facilities, etc. Such pattern of development often renders it impossible
to supply adequate public services. Additionally, the capacity of any community to serve
the needs of its residents depends upon the revenue it receives from real property taxes.
Only commercial and industrial development contribute more in taxes than they receive
in public services; and except for the most expensive kind of housing, residential develop-
ment is never able to pay its way. Thus, a community inundated by recent residential
growth may find itself unable to meet demands for adequate public facilities and services
because it is in short supply of a much needed tax base which can support such develop-
ment at a reasonable tax rate.
It is not difficult to see, then, that to the extent adequate public facilities and services
are at the core of orderly growth, intelligent public solutions respecting land use go a long
way towards facilitating ordered and adequate development. Zoning is one kind of public
solution which affords control over the location, timing and content of private develop-
ment. This is accomplished through the use of measures such as minimum lot or dwelling
size requirements, and districts zoned exclusively for agriculture, industry, recreation or
open space. For example, excessive sprawl and premature land subdivision can be pre-
vented by the
(3) demarcation of an urban service district and zoning of all lands outside this
area for agricultural uses exclusively until such time as the city is prepared to extend
its service zone; (4) high zoning in the outlying sections of the municipality with
the understanding that the requirements will be lowered when a certain percentage
of development has been attained in the intervening area; (5) high zomng restric-
tions in the outlying sectors of the community with the intention of reducing these
when the city is ready to extend sewer and water utilities. Schmandt, Municipal
Control of Urban Expansion, 29 FORDHAMi L. REv. 637, 652 (1961).
Zoning, however, is not the only solution: the conditional use of insured loans; sub-
division controls; "... . public purchase of outlying land (or developmental rights thereto)
to be placed on the market as needs dictate; ... limiting the number of building permits
that are issued each year" are some of the alternatives. Ibid.
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to the kind, content and form of such regulation. 3 Quite apart from this,
however, is the fact that the member communities are usually authorized
to achieve independently and unilaterally solutions to problems which do
not recognize corporate limits-solutions which ignore the nature of such
problems and the interdependence of the affected communities. Indeed,
this separatism frequently evokes no solution at all, but instead often pro-
duces conflicting controls which aggravate the already serious problems of
urban growth. 4 Such conflict is an inevitable result which must follow
from the use of measures which deny the realities of community interde-
pendence. Therefore, some alternative solutions must be considered. This
13. If the regulation effectively prohibits development or all reasonable use of land
it may be found to be excessive and unconstitutional. See, e.g., Aronson v. Town of
Sharon, 346 Mass. 598, 195 N.E.2d 341 (1964); Morris County Land Improvement Co.
v. Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 40 N.J. 539, 193 A.2d 232 (1963); Greenhills
Home Owners Corp. v. Village of Greenhills, 202 N.E.2d 192 (Ohio Ct. App. 1964). If
a regulation is founded upon a comprehensive plan predicated upon future expectations
rather than existing conditions, it may be deemed unreasonable. See Christine Bldg. Co.
v. City of Troy, 367 Mich. 508, 116 N.W.2d 816 (1962). Similarly, if a regulation does
not prevent all kinds of development, but permits some construction to occur, not qualita-
tively distinct from that which is prohibited, then such legislation is subject to attack on
the basis of discrimination and segregation founded upon the prospective buyer's ability to
pay-i.e., the conservation of property values cannot be implemented by social and
economic stratification. See, e.g., Board of County Supervisors v. Carper, 200 Va. 653,
107 S.E.2d 390 (1959). Therein the court found that a zoning ordinance, which im-
posed minimum lot size requirements and which intended to channel urban growth where
the cost of operating government would be more economical with respect to furnishing
police and fire protection, construction and maintenance of public schools and other public
conveniences, was unreasonable and arbitrary and bore no relation to the health, safety,
morals or general welfare of the residents of the area so zoned. For discussion of mini-
mum lot and dwelling size requirements see POOLEY, PLANNING AND ZONING IN THE
UNrrD STATES 90-100 (1961); Haar, Wayne Township: Zoning for Whom?-In Brief
Reply, 67 HARV. L. Rv. 986 (1954); Haar, Zoning for Minimum Standards: The
Wayne Township Case, 66 HARv. L. REv. 1051 (1953).
14. This separatism is not only geographical but functional as well. A school district
may encompass unincorporated as well as incorporated areas of the county. Its board is
elected independently of the county or municipal government of the area it comprehends.
The board is empowered and obligated to serve the educational needs of its public-of its
district. It must build schools, employ teachers and raise the revenue needed to accom-
plish these objectives. Its primary source of revenue is the real property tax which it is
authorized to levy upon the residents of its district. More residents means new schools,
new teachers and increased costs. Invariably a higher tax rate is the only available solu-
tion to the problem facing the school district. However, this is not the only nor always the
best solution to the problem. The content and location of new development-patterns of
land use-affect both the demand for increased educational facilities and the ability to
pay for it. Yet matters of land use control are not within the purview of the school dis-
trict; they are within the scope of authority of both county and municipal governments.
Therefore, meaningful solutions to the problems which confront a school district cannot
be found in the separate and independent actions of affected governmental units. Co-
operation and joint action is absolutely essential.
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article, then, is concerned with the resolution of those problems of urban
growth which invariably envelop an entire region. More specifically, it
examines the legal machinery, particularly extraterritorial zoning, which
has or may be used in accomplishing these objectives and in overcoming
the obstacles posed by the proliferation of municipal boundaries.
I. INTRATERRITORIAL CONTROLS: EXTRATERRITORIAL CONSIDERATIONS
AND THE COURTS
To some extent the courts have attempted to cope with the foregoing
problems inherent in accelerated regional growth. In reviewing the reason-
ableness of ordinances which regulate local land use, courts have sometimes
been willing to look beyond municipal boundaries. In passing upon the
validity of a particular zoning ordinance, they have given serious considera-
tion to regional development and regional needs. In the main, however, this
judicial recognition of extraterritorial factors has been confined to a review
of the independent efforts of communities to control development within
their own borders, and any notion of regionalism embodied in these decisions
has been limited and self-serving to the zoning community.
A. Conflict Between Neighboring Zoned or Existing Uses-A
Test of Reasonableness
Basically there are three kinds of situations in which courts have con-
sidered regional or extraterritorial development, zoning, facilities, or needs
in reviewing the validity of local legislation." First-there is the case in
which a zoning ordinance or amendment classifies a tract of land differently
from land located in an adjacent municipality and the courts are asked by a
landowner within either the zoning municipality or the adjoining munici-
pality to consider extra-municipal zoning and development as evidence of
the unreasonableness of such legislation." Almost without exception courts
have, in this situation, been willing to examine the character of land use in
the neighboring municipality and in so doing have in some instances
15. Note, Zoning: Looking Beyond Municipal Borders, 1965 WASH. U.L.Q. 107, 107-
08.
16. See id. at 108-15.
17. A second problem.. . which would not be solved by extraterritorial control, is
that of conflicting uses in adjacent incorporated areas. These may destroy the land
use planning of adjacent areas just as if one area were unincorporated. Further-
more, courts have looked with increasing frequency to uses in adjacent municipali-
ties to determine the validity of a zoning classification, arguing that zoning, to meet
the statutory requirement that it be comprehensive, may have to take into account
land uses in neighboring units. This indicates that municipalities in metropolitan
areas will be required to work together more closely or to take into consideration
the land uses in the adjoining municipality in determining zoning classifications.
Melli & Devoy, Extraterritorial Planning and Urban Growth, 1959 Win. L. Rrv. 55, 65-
66. See id. at 65-66, n.52; Note, 1965 WASH. U.L.Q. 107, 108-09 nn.9 & 10.
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adopted a limited concept of regionalism' -- that a zoning ordinance is
a lawful exercise of the police power only so long as it is founded upon a
plan which is reasonable; that a zoning ordinance is an unreasonable exer-
cise of the police power if it does not have as its primary purpose the pro-
tection of the public health, safety, morals or general welfare; that the
public for whose health, safety, morals and general welfare an ordinance is
enacted is not limited to the residents of the zoning municipality but instead
comprehends those who are directly affected by the land uses authorized by
such legislation---and therefore the reasonableness of any zoning ordi-
18. See Borough of Cresskill v. Borough of Dumont, 15 N.J. 238, 104 A.2d 441
(1954). In this case the Borough of Dumont rezoned one block of an area zoned for
residential purposes to business uses. The area circumscribed by this amendment was ad-
jacent to land located in three neighboring boroughs which was zoned and developed for
residential purposes. A suit was filed by the neighboring boroughs and several of its
residents challenging such amendment. Their complaint charges that the amendatory
ordinance was not in accordance with the comprehensive zoning plan in effect in the four
neighboring boroughs in that it failed to take into account the prevailing conditions
throughout these four communities and that it was enacted in utter disregard of the
interests of the contiguous residential areas of its neighbors. The plaintiffs at the trial
introduced evidence that the presence of a business district would aggravate existing
traflic conditions to the detriment of the public generally, particularly the residents of
the entire area, and would depreciate the value of residential property within the im-
mediate vicinity of such business district. The Supreme Court of New Jersey affirmed a
decision of the Law Division of the Superior Court setting aside such amendment. The
basis of the supreme court's decision was that such amendment constituted spot zoning.
However, in the course of its opinion, the court rejected the Borough of Dumont's con-
tention that "the responsibility of a municipality for zoning halts at the municipal bound-
ary lines without regard to the effect of its zoning ordinances on adjoining and nearby
land outside the municipality." Id. at 247, 104 A.2d at 145. The court stated:
Such a view might prevail where there are large undeveloped areas at the borders
of two contiguous towns, but it cannot be tolerated where, as here, the area is
built up and one cannot tell when one is passing from one borough to another.
Knickerbocker Road and Massachusetts Avenue are not Chinese walls separating
Dumont from the adjoining boroughs. At the very least Dumont owes a duty to
hear any residents and taxpayers of adjoining municipalities who may be adversely
affected by proposed zoning changes and to give as much consideration to their
rights as they would to those of residents and taxpayers of Dumont. To do less
would be to make a fetish out of invisible municipal boundary lines and a mockery
of the principles of zoning. There is no merit to the defendant's contention. Id. at
247, 104 A.2d at 445.46.
19. It is worth excerpting a portion of the opinion of the superior court in Borough of
Creukill v. Borough of Dumont, 28 N.J. Super. 26, 100 A.2d 182 (L. 1953), aff'd, 15
N.J. 238, 104 A.2d 441 (1954) ; particularly the courts reference to the vested rights of
affected property owners.
Once a municipality adopts a valid zoning ordinance prohibiting a particular use
in an established use area, the general public has a right to rely upon the provisions
of the ordinance. The restriction is for the benefit of the public health, morals and
welfare, which includes all those of the public who are benefited by the restriction.
The public health, morals and welfare are not limited by the boundaries of any
particular zoning district, nor even by the boundaries of the municipality adopting
the ordinance. Property outside the established use area, and even property outside
the municipality, if benefited by the prohibited use, acquires a vested right to any
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nance is to be adjudged by the character of development lying immediately
within and without the corporate limits of the zoning municipality.- The
regionalism suggested by these cases is necessarily limited for two reasons. In
most of the decisions the development, and consequently the affected public,
which is considered is that extraterritorial development within an adjacent
municipality which is proximate to the boundaries of the zoning munici-
pality. Because the impact area is nearly always restricted in this fashion,
it is difficult to ascribe any meaningful notion of regionalism to these
decisions. Additionally, in many of these cases the courts are asked to take
account of extraterritorial zoning and development in reviewing the reason-
ableness of an intraterritorial zoning classification with respect to land
located within such district. Therein the legislative impact with which a
court is concerned is purely intraterritorial; the focus of judicial inquiry is
inward and not outward.2 Indeed, the problem to be resolved is a local
one and not extraterritorial. It is hardly distinguishable from those instances
in which courts are asked to consider the zoning and character of surround-
ing development within a municipality when adjudging the reasonableness
of a zoning ordinance as it applies to a particular plot of land.
benefits accruing from the restriction. It is almost inevitable that an adjoining
municipality will be affected in some degree by the zoning regulations along its
border adopted by its next door neighbor. Zoning regulations must be in accord-
ance with a comprehensive plan, and they must be made with reasonable considera.
tion to the peculiar suitability of the land for a particular use, and with a view of
conserving the value of property and encouraging the most appropriate use thereof.
Hence, it becomes a legal requirement that the restrictions and regulations in a
zoning ordinance must be made with reasonable consideration to the character of
the land and also the character of the neighborhood lying along the border of
the municipality adopting the ordinance. Id. at 42-43, 100 A.2d at 191. (Citations
omitted.)
20. It has traditionally been a fundamental aspect of zoning that the police power
so used must be used reasonably, that is to say, it must not be used capriciously, but
according to some form of plan. The courts seem to have grasped the essential
fact which has eluded legislators, namely, that a perfectly reasonable plan for the
development of-say-a block may become unreasonable when looked at in terms
of the municipality. Similarly, a reasonable municipal plan may be nonsense when
looked at in terms of a metropolis. This unreasonability, which individual munici-
palities seem somewhat loath to accept, goes a long way towards rendering un-
constitutional all zoning at present carried out. There can be no doubt that the
courts possess a weapon of considerable force in judicially reviewing zoning ordi-
nances, and that the imposition of a duty to accept into local planning and zoning
philosophies decisions which have been communally made elsewhere, either by
other municipalites or by some form of regional planning commission, may well
come in the end from the courts and not from the legislature. POOLEY, op. cit.
supra note 13, at 30-31.
21. See Note, 1965 WAsH. U.L.Q. 107, 108-15; particularly note the discussion of
Huttig v. City of Richmond Heights, 372 S.W.2d 833 (Mo. 1963), and Dowsey v.
Village of Kensington, 257 N.Y. 221, 177 N.E. 427 (1931).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1966/iss1/3
CONTROLLING REGIONAL LAND DEVELOPMENT
B. Extraterritorial Development and Exclusion of Local Land
Uses-Is This Regionalism?
Second-there is the case in which a municipality excludes certain land
uses from within its borders.2 When such legislation is challenged the courts
frequently are requested to depart from the traditional notion that a munici-
pality must allocate sufficient land for commercial and industrial use within
its borders to provide its residents with a place to live and work. They are
asked to consider the existence of regional development and facilities in
determining whether a local public need has been satisfied. Recently courts
have invoked principles of regionalism in finding that certain land uses,
particularly industrial and commercial development, can reasonably be
excluded from a muncipality if such need is satisfied by available facilities
in nearby communities. 3 However, except in those cases in which "com-
munities have attempted to ban uses-often necessary for civilized existence,
such as a hospital, sanitarium, or jail-which they prefer to see located else-
where than within their own borders,"2 , the foregoing principles have been
applied only for the purpose of saving a proposed regulation. Other than to
22. Note, 1965 WASH. U.L.Q. 107, 115-17.
23. Valley View Village, Inc. v. Proffett, 221 F.2d 412 (6th Cir. 1955); Lionshead
Lake, Inc. v. Township of Wayne, 10 N.J. 165, 89 A.2d 693 (1952), appeal dismissed,
344 U.S. 919 (1953); Duffcon Concrete Prods., Inc. v. Borough of Cresskill, 1 N.J. 509,
64 A.2d 347 (1949).
In both Duffcon Concrete Prods., Inc. v. Borough of Cresskill and Valley View Village,
Inc. v. ,Proffett, heavy industry was excluded from the community by a local zoning
ordinance. In both instances the courts upheld the exclusionary ordinance finding that
the need for industrially zoned land was satisfied by areas beyond the community's border.
In the Duffcon case the court stated:
What may be the most appropriate use of any particular property depends not only
on all the conditions, physical, economic and social, prevailing within the municipal-
ity and its needs, present and reasonably prospective, but also on the nature of the
entire region in which the municipality is located and the use to which the land in
that region has been put or may be put most advantageously. Id. at 513, 64 A.2d
at 349-50.
The court then concluded:
And where, as here, there exists a small residential municipality the physical loca-
tion and circumstances of which are such that it is best suited for continuing resi-
dential development and, separated therefrom but in the same geographical region,
there is present a concentration of industry in an area peculiarly adapted to indus-
trial development and sufficiently large to accommodate such development for
years to come, the power of the municipality to restrict its territory to residential
purposes with ample provision for such small businesses, trades and light industries
as are needed to serve the residents, is clear. Id. at 515, 64 A.2d at 351.
And in the Proffett case the court concluded:
We think that it is not clearly arbitrary and unreasonable for a residential village
to pas an ordinance preserving its residential character, so long as the business and
industrial needs of its inhabitants are supplied by other accessible areas in the com-
munity at large. Valley View Village, Inc. v. Proffett, supra at 418.
24. Haar, supra note 13, at 1053, 1053-54 n.11.
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deny the relevance of extraterritorial development and facilities regarding
the validity of local exclusions, the courts apparently are reluctant to second
guess local legislatures regarding the question of whether a local public need
has been satisfied by either internal or external development and facilities.
The complexity of such a determination seems to justify such reluctance;-
it also illustrates the uneasy foundation upon which such ordinances must
stand.2"
Quite apart from the foregoing discussion, it is difficult to say that these
decisions by themselves embrace any meaningful concept of regionalism in
resolving the important problems of land use. Indeed, courts have been
unwilling to say much more than that municipalities, in defending the
reasonableness of an ordinance which excludes certain land uses from within
their borders, may and sometimes must rely upon extraterritorial factors.
These opinions have not in any significant way required a municipality to
look to the needs and facilities of its neighbors in formulating a zoning
scheme which must be reasonable in the light of the total environment in
which the municipality exists. Such application of alleged principles of
regionalism by separate municipalities independent of one another, pri-
marily to save the self-serving ordinances of each municipality, focuses on
and breeds isolationism rather than collective solutions to metropolitan or
regional problems. "[T]o say that a municipality may take action to pre-
vent harm to itself is one thing; to say that it must take the legitimate needs
and desires of other communities into consideration seems quite another."-2
It is one thing to invoke a policy of regionalism to justify shifting the burdens
of metropolitan growth to other communities; it is quite another to invoke
principles of regionalism to require the absorption of the burdens of metro-
politan growth in the formulation of a single community's comprehensive
plan and zoning ordinance. Moreover, though state courts are supposedly
the final arbiter in these matters, they are totally without the important
25. A conscientious determination of whether municipality "A" should be permitted
to exclude a particular use when enacting its zoning scheme, demands more than a
quick look at an adjacent municipality (municipality "B") to ascertain whether
"B" has allocated enough land within its borders to that use to supply the needs of
both "A" and "B" for that facility. For example, although facilities in "B" are
presently sufficient to satisfy the needs of both "A" and "B," they may be insufficient
in the future because of prospective residential development in either municipality.
Similarly, it may be that while the facilites in "B" are more adequate for both
the present and prospective needs of "A" and "B," those facilities must also be used
by a third municipality ("0") which is less able to provide for its own needs than
"A." In both of the above situations it would seem that "A" should not be per-
mitted to exclude the use in question. This illustration points up only tvo of the
many possible regional questions which the court should examine in deciding these
cases. A comprehensive regional plan would serve as a guide for such decisions. In
the absence of such a plan, the court must construct an ad hoc plan for the region
each time the question arises whether a local need is satisfied by facilities in an ad-joining municipality. Note, 1965 WAsH. U.L.Q. 107, 117-18 n.33.
26. POOLEY, op. cit. supra note 13, at 29.
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powers to initiate-this is the prerogative of local government. Indeed, a
zoning ordinance must follow from a local determination of external and
internal needs, development, and facilities. Invariably, these legislative
decisions are reached unilaterally despite the fact that their impact is nearly
always both internal and external. This would seem to be the antithesis of
any policy founded upon the notion that problems which affect and are
common to an entire region ought to be resolved by the collective efforts of
the communities so affected-problems which do not recognize municipal
borders necessitate solutions unencumbered by territorial limitations either
in their formulation or application. Finally, though the judicially sanctioned
use exclusion may have some measure of permanence with respect to a
particular property owner, it is hardly more than a fleeting commentary on
regional development and land use patterns and the satisfaction of local
needs. One can scarcely count upon the legislative determinations which
underlie municipal exclusions to give rise to reliable expectations as to ex-
traterritorial land use and development. As matters now stand, Municipal-
ity "A", having allocated substantial acreage for industrial development,
cannot and probably should not be estopped by Municipalities "B" and
"C", who have excluded industrial land use from their communities, from
rezoning portions of such industrial district to exclusive residential use be-
cause "A" is now unable to satisfy the business and employment needs of
the residents of "A", "B", and "C". Meaningful solutions to regional
problems must produce stability rather than potential chaos.
C. Intraterritorial Zoning and the Satisfaction of Regional Needs
Last-there is the case in which courts are asked to find a municipal duty
to serve regional needs in the exercise of municipal power to zone intra-
territorially." To begin with, one might conclude that if courts have held
that the presence of extraterritorial facilities and development may save a
municipal ordinance which excludes certain uses from within its borders so
long as local needs have been satisfied, it must follow that these same courts
ought to find a local ordinance unreasonable if it fails to satisfy regional
land use needs. It appears, however, that though several courts have
recognized a duty to serve a "public" which reaches beyond the territorial
limits of a municipality, these courts have not yet found such regional need
sufficient to justify invalidating a local ordinance.2" Perhaps this has been
27. See generally Note, 1965 WAsH. U.L.Q. 107, 118-21.
28. See Wrigley Properties, Inc. v. City of Ladue, 369 S.W.2d 397 (Mo. 1963);
Fanale v. Borough of Hasbrouck Heights, 26 N.J. 320, 139 A.2d 749 (1958); cf.
Andrews v. Board of Adjustment, 30 N.J. 245, 152 A.2d 580 (1959).
Whether a municipal duty to zone can be based on regional needs is a question
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so because of the fundamental notion that a municipality is constituted to
exercise its powers, police or otherwise, on behalf of only its residents.2" This
position, though traditional, rests upon a foundation which is cracking.
Certainly in theory it should hardly be open to serious argument that a
test of reasonableness comprehends the affected "public" whether they
reside within or without the zoning municipality." Implicit in those deci-
sions in which courts have, in passing upon the validity of a zoning ordi-
nance, considered the effect of a particular ordinance upon neighboring
extraterritorial development is the premise that the "public," for whose
health, safety, morals and general welfare a community must regulate, does
and should include those who reside outside as well as within the zoning
municipality.31 Yet it has been said that these opinions are not authority
that has been only partially answered. No court has directly faced the question
whether the satisfaction of regional needs is a proper ground for upholding a zoning
ordinance, and only two cases were found in which courts have considered whether
a local ordinance could be held invalid because of its failure to satisfy a regional
need.
,. i
In both cases in which the courts were asked to find a zoning ordinance invalid
because of a regional need, the need was found insufficient to justify overturning the
ordinances....
The Wrigley and Fanale cases imply a municipal duty to satisfy regional needs,
but offer equivocal answers to the question of what conditions must exist before that
duty arises. The Wrigley case suggests that the municipality should provide for the
regional need if in the adjacent region there is no available land with which the
regional need can be satisfied. The Fanale case suggests that the sizes of the zoning
municipality and the region in which the need exists should be compared. The
implied duty therefore appears to be a severely qualified one which does not re-
quire the municipality to consider the best possible location for the needed
facility. For example, in Wrigley evidence indicated that the land available in the
zoning municipality was better suited for the shopping center than the com-
mercially zoned land across the street. Also a "preliminary land-use plan" of the
county in which the municipality was located indicated that a comercial use
would be desirable. Similarly, in Fanale, although land was available in the
county for apartment building and the zoning borough was of comparatively small
size, the zoning borough may have been the most suitable location for additional
apartments from a regional standpoint because of its proximity to industry and
major transportation arteries. Note, 1965 WASH. U.L.Q. 107, 118-20. (Footnotes
omitted.)
29. Id. at 118.
30. Is not the evidence clear for all to see that the reasonableness of a municipality's
land use regulations, in a metropolitan area, must bear relation to the development
of the area as a whole? It is clearly unreasonable to say that the court should
modestly avert its gaze once it has arrived at municipal boundaries. For while there
is much sense in saying that a municipality's powers should end at its political
boundaries, it does violence to reason to say that in exercising its powers (and
above all its zoning powers) it may ignore the implications of the urban environ-
ment in which it finds itself. .. . [Pjlanning and zoning enabling acts should re-
quire municipalities in metropolitan areas to prepare plans, and that these plans
should be in conformity with those of their neighbors. POOLEY, Op. Cit. supra note
13, at 35.
31. In particular, see Borough of Cresskill v. Borough of Dumont, 28 N.J. Super. 26,
100 A.2d 182 (L. 1953), aff'd, 15 N.J. 283, 104 A.2d 441 (1954). See notes 19-20
supra.
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for the proposition that a municipality has a duty to zone for regional
needs-that the judicial review of the reasonableness of a zoning ordinance
in the light of its extraterritorial effect has necessitated only a marginal and
not a regional extension of the impact area that must be considered. 2 To
be sure, these cases are distinguishable; however, the underlying principle is
the same. Indeed, such decisions recognize the existence of a public welfare
which penetrates the veil of municipal boundaries. If the affected "public!'
included only the residents of the municipality itself, a court could not justify
invalidating a local ordinance because it authorized land uses which con-
flicted with nearby extraterritorial development. Courts may balk at approv-
ing a municipal duty to zone for regional needs, but it should not be for
the foregoing reason that the police power can only be exercised on behalf
of a municipality's residents.
The existence of a regional need is not always recognized or agreed upon;
it is frequently a conclusion founded upon inconclusive facts as well as a
series of value judgments. The satisfaction of such need invariably requires
the imposition of a burden upon the local community, particularly one
which consists largely of established single-family dwelling units. The
32. See Note, 1965 WAsH. U.L.Q. 107, 118.
33. A residential community consisting of homes on lots of two or more acres is
likely to resist the influx of homes on substantially smaller lots however great the regional
need may be for the suitable location of low cost housing. A burgeoning urban popula-
tion means that homes and employment must ideally be found for every stratum of society.
People must live somewhere and frequently the most suitable location in terms of
growth and land use patterns is in or nearby a community or area devoted to other pur-
poses. A substantial increase in residents, particularly if it raises the population density,
means more cars, more police, crowded schools or perhaps new ones-in the main, en-
larged demands for public services and facilities. Inevitably inexpensive housing also
means that the costs of satisfying new demands for services and facilities will exceed the
incremental increase in the tax base. Invariably the consequential deficit can only be
erased by raising the tax rate. In the end this means that older residential development
must shoulder a substantial share of the burden of urban growth so long as it is unable
to insulate itself against the intrusion of low cost housing-so long as it must satisfy im-
portant regional needs.
The regional need may vary. It may consist of a need for a suitable location for
housing; it may also consist of a need for adequate shopping or an enlarged industrial
base. In Wrigley Properties, Inc. v. City of Ladue, 369 S.W.2d 397 (Mo. 1963) property
owners whose land was located on the outskirts of Ladue sought to have a court declare
that their ten-acre tract must be rezoned from residential to commercial. In support of
their position they maintained that the growth of the region had changed conditions
in the area so greatly that the rezoning of plaintiff's ten acres to commercial use was
necessary to serve the physical and economic needs of the area-to do otherwise would be
arbitrary and unreasonable. The St. Louis County Planning Director and others testi-
fied that from the standpoint of county planning, but not that of the municipality, this
tract was ideally located and suited for the proposed commercial use-a shopping center
which would service several rapidly growing municipalities in need of such a facility.
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judicial recognition of a municipal duty to zone for regional needs would
seem to require that each municipality in enacting a zoning ordinance must
first evaluate local and regional growth patterns, problems and interests,
and then independently adopt an ordinance which must in some measure
satisfy the foregoing needs by its regulation of intraterritorial land use. Each
community must account for the zoning, development, problems and needs
of its neighbors, and then by itself act accordingly. This may or may not
be accomplished with some notion of what its neighbors are doing or are
going to do about these kinds of problems. Quite apart from the fact that
a court may disagree with the limited judgment of a community on these
matters, it is indeed asking quite a lot of a community on its own, and as
far as it may know by itself, to assume the burdens which affect the entire
region. The following response should not be unexpected-"Why me?
Why not them? I will if they will." Another basis for questioning the
imposition of a municipal duty to zone for regional needs might be found
in the external cost-benefit analysis of Professor Dunham. All of zoning
restricts private freedom and in so doing a property owner is compelled to
confer a benefit upon his neighbors. Yet it has been said that such benefit
must be achieved only by the prevention of those land uses which impose
external harm or costs upon others. Such restriction upon land use is within
the proper scope of the police power-it is constitutional. It is not, how-
ever, constitutional to achieve such benefit by compelling a land owner to
serve the needs of the community without regard to the external costs of his
activity. Such needs can only be served by public purchase.3 4 Similarly,
The trial court ordered judgment for the defendants. On appeal the Supreme Court of
Missouri affirmed, noting that since the question of rezoning was debatable the munici-
pality's determination should not be upset.
Sufficient reasons which the council could have found for reaching its decision are
that the proposed use as a shopping center appears to be more for the benefit of
other cities and towns than for the benefit of Ladue; that there is more than ample
space for such a shopping center on the opposite corner of the intersection . . in
Frontenac already zoned commercial; that traffic around present adjacent built-up
residential districts would be increased, flooding conditions from rains aggravated
and values adversely affected; that all of Ladue adjoining Lindbergh . . . is zoned
residential with many fine homes constructed; that there was still vacant area along
Clayton Road in Ladue, zoned commercial, sufficient to serve the city's population;
and that Ladue still is a fine residential community with parks . .. and residential
growth prospects making residential use of the . . . tract involved reasonable....
[Ilt does not sufficiently appear that any need therefor of the entire region cannot
be provided outside of Ladue but instead it reasonably could be found that there
are available nearby larger commercially zoned areas to do so. Id. at 402.
34. See Dunham, A Legal and Economic Basis For City Planning, 58 COLUIu. L. Rnv.
650 (1958).
Notwithstanding the confusion in the planning literature concerning the differ-
ence in principle between restricting (that is zoning) in order to prevent one land
use from putting an external harm on others, and restricting or zoning to compel a
land use which will benefit others, there is a real difference which has important
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though we may have no reservations about preventing a community from
authorizing land uses which impose external costs or harm upon its neigh-
bors, we may be reluctant to require a community to confer a benefit upon
its neighbors by devoting its land resources to the solution of those problems
which affect the region."' Perhaps for these reasons courts have not yet
ethical, political, and constitutional consequences. True, it may be said that when
the owner of parcel A is prevented from harming the owner of parcel B a benefit is
thereby conferred upon B, so that in reality all restrictions confer a benefit. Practi-
cally speaking, however, the benefit resulting from elimination of a harm does not
result from any particular land use; the benefit results from non-use in a particular
way rather than from any of the permissible uses. On the other hand the benefit
resulting from a restriction designed to obtain a benefit most often can result only
from the one or more permitted uses. No community or external benefit is obtained
from zoning land to industrial uses unless the desired industrial development results
from the decision of some person in the market. But the exclusion of industrial uses
from a residential zone eliminates a harm, and the consequent benefit results from
whatever other use, including no-use, the owner makes of his land.
[T]o compel a particular owner to undertake an activity to benefit the public,
even if in the form of a restriction, is to compel one person to assume the cost of a
benefit conferred on others without hope for recoupment of the cost .... The evil
: , , is that there is no approximation of equal sharing of cost or of sharing accord-
ing to capacity to pay as there is where a public benefit is obtained by subsidy or
expenditure of public funds. The accident of ownership of a particular location
determines the persons in the community bearing the cost of increasing the general
welfare. A further consequence of an attempt to obtain a benefit by means of a
restriction is that the full cost of the public benefit is thereby concealed from those
in our democratic society who are given the power of deciding whether or not they
want to obtain a benefit.
There is much in American constitutional law to support this distinction although
precise accuracy in application is not required under the rule of deference to the
legislative judgment. Thus it has been held unconstitutional to compel an owner,
without compensation, to leave his land vacant in order to obtain the advantages of
open land for the public or in order to save the land for future public purchase,
but it is within constitutional power to compel an owner to leave a portion of his
land vacant where building would be harmful to the use and enjoyment of other
land (e.g., set-back lines). It is unconstitutional to compel an owner to commit his
land to park use in order to meet the public desire for a park, but an owner may
be compelled to furnish a portion of his land for a park where the need for a park
results primarily from activity on other land of the owner. It is unconstitutional to
compel him to use his land as a parking lot in order to obtain a parking lot for
the community, but it is within constitutional power to compel an owner to provide
a parking lot for the parking needs of activities on his own land .... It is not per-
missible to compel an owner to hold land in reserve for industrial purposes by re-
stricting his use to industrial purposes only, but it is permissible to exclude industrial
development from districts where such development -ill harm other uses in the
district. Id. at 664-67.
35. One might suggest, however, that Professor Dunham's external harm-benefit test
loses some of its appeal in its translation to community-regional relationship. This is
especially so if the following assumption is accepted: that a regional land use need-
whether it be low cost housing or a shopping center-must be satisfied at some time and
somewhere and that its satisfaction is the problem and task of both the region and its
member communities. Each time a community closes its doors to development which is
vital to the area but costly or burdensome to the community-though it may be the most
suitable location for such use-it is, by its very failure to assume its particular responsi-
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recognized a duty to zone for regional needs, unless there is no other land
available, despite the fact that the zoning municipality might otherwise
have been the most suitable location for the satisfaction of such regional
need. 6
To call for a rigorous application of a test of reasonableness based upon
regional considerations will at best afford piecemeal and often unsatisfactory
solutions to the foregoing problems. Absent a regional or metropolitan land
use plan, both the municipality and the courts are confronted with the
exceedingly difficult task of undertaking an ad hoc formulation and review
of legislation which must reasonably reflect and resolve those problems which
confront the entire area. Such a policy should produce much and extended
litigation. The end result in any specific case can hardly be certain, or
bility in regional life, imposing added burdens and costs upon its neighbors. Consider the
metropolitan area made up of municipalities "A," "B,") C0," "D," and "E." "A," "B,"
"C," and "D," in anticipation of intensive urban growth, zone themselves exclusively for
large lot-meaning high cost-residential development. Municipality "E," the core city,
remains the sole repository for much needed low cost housing. It should be obvious that
the independent actions of "A," "B3' "C," and 'D" have shifted a regional burden and
cost to "E." Our sense of fairness and collective responsibility perhaps is not aroused be-
cause such zoning has done nothing more than preserve the existing character of each of
these municipalities. Yet in the end, one may conclude that we ought not to be opposed
to forcing individual community recognition of regional needs even though we may be
opposed to compelling the individual property owner to confer a community benefit by
devoting his land to the satisfaction of a local need. In the former case we can probably
say that the burden is most often distributed amongst the residents of an entire com-
munity, while in the latter instance it is perhaps undemocratically placed on the shoulders
of an individual property owner.
36. See note 28 supra.
At best this discussion should only explain the reluctance of courts to second guess the
judgment of local governing bodies and to find unreasonable zoning ordinances which do
not serve the best interests of the region. It should not be asserted as a final basis for
rejecting satisfaction of regional needs as a factor which must have a bearing upon the
reasonableness of any given local ordinance. If this argument were carried to its logical
extreme it would force the condemnation of all zoning which allocates land exclusively to
uses needed to serve either the community or the region. This would be so even if the
zoning or planning authority comprehended the affected region or metropolitan area.
This would also be so even if no other available location for such land use could be
found in the area.
Land resources are not an unlimited commodity. That which we have must serve all
of the varying needs of society. It ought not to be misused or squandered. One can no
longer assume that the market place will, without some regulation, make the necessary or
most desirable allocation of these resources. The record has been made; urban sprawl is
around most everywhere for one to witness. The public interest is a vital one; it ought
not to be denied participation in the making of important locational decisions. Zoning
should not be confined to the prevention of only that private activity which imposes
external harm or costs upon others. The problems and needs of a region are necessarily
those of its member communities. Interdependence is unmistakably a reality. Lasting
solutions require joint efforts and common sacrifices.
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even consistent, with other decisions. Consequently, the legality of any
zoning district would be subject to constant doubt so long as a court might
find it invalid because it was, from a regional standpoint, the most suitable
location for uses which were excluded by such classification. The fact
remains then that the resolution of pressing problems of regional land use
necessitates at least some centralization of authority to plan and perhaps
even regulate. This is a responsibility which should not and cannot be
assumed by the courts. Judicial review of the reasonableness of an ordi-
nance must be and is limited to the specific facts of only those cases in
which local residents elect to challenge a particular ordinance. At best,
local courts can only afford protection against the clearly unreasonable
actions of local legislatures-the problem demands more than this.
II. SOLUTION-COUNTY, METROPOLITAN, OR REGIONAL CONTROL?
An obvious and probably a convenient place to centralize and coordinate
efforts to plan and regulate would seem to be the state or one of its sub-
divisions--the county. Yet, in the case of the latter, and in some instances
it is true of the former as well, the affected area and the resulting land use
problems may not be confined to a single county. 7 Though a great many
states have passed legislation which enables counties to zone,3" such power
to zone is for the most part restricted to unincorporated areas within the
county," and in some instances a county zoning ordinance applies only to
37. See POOLEY, op. cit. supra note 13.
The proper planning of metropolitan areas clearly calls for the existence of a
planning body whose jurisdiction is not limited by existing municipal boundaries.
County boundaries may include more comprehensive areas, but again they do not in
theory or in fact have a significant relationship to urban communities. County plan-
ning, therefore, while remaining an essential part of the national planning program,
is unlikely to provide an adequate answer to metropolitan planning problems. Id.
at 23.
Consider for example the urbanization of the Cape Kennedy impact area. By 1962
federal and local authorities had recognized that the developmental impact of the space
center extended well beyond the boundaries of Brevord County, the site of most of the
space related activities. In 1959, Florida had passed legislation enabling countries to par-
take of cooperative planning. So in February, 1962, pursuant to the recommendation of a
committee fostered by the Florida Development Commission and the Federal Housing and
Home Finance Agency, the East Central Florida Regional Planning Council was formed.
It included the six counties which were most affected by the urban development arising
out of the space center activities. In July, 1963, a seventh county was added to the
membership of the Council. The Council's function was to serve as a long-range-plan-
ning advisory body. See generally EAST CENTRAL FLOlUDA REGIONAL PLANNING COUN-
CIL, NIRLImINARY REGIONAL PLAN 1964.
38. This includes approximately one-third of the states. HoRAcK & NOLAN, LAND USE
CONTROLS 101 (1955).
39. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 34, § 3151 (Smith-Hurd 1962); Wis. STAT. ANN.
1 59.97 (1957). The Illinois statute provides in part:
[Tihe board of supervisors . . . of each county, shall have the power to regulate
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those towns which have adopted it." Consequently, the effectiveness of
county zoning, as a comprehensive method for controlling area-wide
development, is curtailed initially by the very terms of the enabling statute.
Furthermore, because counties are generally not permitted to zone within
incorporated communities, there is always the possibility that a county and
municipality will adopt zoning ordinances which authorize conflicting land
uses upon adjacent properties.4 '
Another point which, as a practical matter, may limit the effectiveness of
county zoning or perhaps accentuate the potential conflict between county
and municipal ordinances "is that cities are more apt to have experienced
staffs and superior facilities putting them in a much better position than the
county to administer land use controls in the urban fringe. 42 Moreover, the
presence of enabling legislation does not mean that all counties within a
state will elect to enact a county zoning ordinance." This means, of course,
and restrict the location and use of buildings ... to establish building or set back
lines on or along any street... or storm or floodwater runoff channel or basin out-
side the limits of cities, villages and incorporated towns; to divide the entire county
outside the limits of such cities, villages and incorporated towns into districts ....
See generally Wehrwein, County Zoning and Consolidation, 11 Wis. L. REv. 136 (1936).
40. See the discussion of Wis. STAT. ANN. § 59.97(2) (d) (1957) in Melli & Devoy,
supra note 17.
However, under the Wisconsin statute a county zoning ordinance is in force in
only those towns which have approved it; in some counties such approval has been
confined to one or two towns. Consequently, county zoning may be much less
effective than would appear from the number of counties which have adopted
zoning ordinances. Id. at 64.
41. In one instance known to the authors, a land owner was prevented from building
the type of structure he had planned when he purchased the land prior to annexation,
because the uses allowed by the city differed from those allowed by the county, even
though the city on annexation did not change the type of classification. Id. at 64-65.
However, see attempted solution to this problem in ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 34, § 3152
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1965) which provides in part:
If any municiplity having a zoning ordinance wishes to protest the proposed county
zoning provisions for the area within one and one-half miles of its corporate limits,
it shall appear at a hearing and submit in writing specific proposals to the com-
mission for zoning such territory. If the commission approves of such proposals they
shall be incorporated within the report of the commission and its proposed ordi-
nance.
.... If the proposals made by a municipality ... are not incorporated in their
entirety into the ordinance proposed to be enacted by the county board, the county
board shall not enact the proposed zoning of such area within one and one-half
miles of such municipality except by three-fourths vote of all members.
42. Melli & Devoy, supra note 17, at 64.
43. For example, as of 1958 the Wisconsin State Planning Division knew of forty-two
counties with zoning ordinances. Ibid. There are seventy-two counties in Wisconsin.
For charts showing frequency in which fringe areas outside of corporate limits of a
city are regulated by county zoning ordinances or otherwise see SENOSTOCK, Op. cd. supra
note 8, at 65-66. For example, only 46% of all counties in the United States have a
county zoning ordinance where a city within such county has no extraterritorial zoning
authority.
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that the passage of an enabling statute insures neither the adoption of nor
efficient administration of meaningful land use controls within the county.
Finally, many of the county zoning ordinances which have been enacted are
directed primarily at the regulation and conservation of the soil and the
preservation of rural areas." Frequently the county ordinance will provide
for various districts such as forestry, grazing, cultivation and recreational
which are not common to urban zoning." Consequently, county zoning
often differs in substance from municipal zoning. 6 Though a municipality
may include an agricultural district, its purpose is not so much the conser-
vation of agricultural resources but instead the control of the timing and
location of intensive urban growth by the retention of a basically non-de-
velopmental use. 7 Because of this inherent difference in function and ap-
44. See HORACK & NOLAN, op. cit. supra note 38, at 99-102. For a discussion of
county zoning in Wisconsin see Wehrwein, supra note 39.
45. E.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 59.97(1) (a) (1957). For a discussion of Florence
County zoning ordinance see HoVt.AcK & NOLAN, Op. cit. supra note 38, at 101-02.
46. HORACK & NOLAN, op. cit. supra note 38.
The meaning and purpose of an agricultural zone depends upon whether it is
created in an urban or rural zoning ordinance. In a city ordinance it usually means
a district from which industrial or business uses are excluded, where any type of
residential structure may be erected, and where any agricultural or horticultural
activity (other than processing) may be pursued .... It is often created to com-
plete a comprehensive plan in "fringe" areas without arousing too much opposition
from the farmers. . . . The objective of the district is not to protect or preserve
agricultural uses but to retain the land in its undeveloped state so that it will be
available for residence, business, or industrial development as the community grows.
In a rural zoning ordinance there is less likelihood that an "agricultural zone" as
such will be created; more commonly, the zones are for cultivation, grazing,
forestry, etc. In other words, a true rural zoning ordinance attempts to protect and
develop the proper uses of the soil. Rural zoning, of course, seeks to control non-
agricultural uses as well. Thus, business and industry may be restricted to particular
zones. Id. at 99-100.
47. See Cutler, Legal and Illegal Methods for Controlling Community Growth on the
Urban Fringe, 1961 Wis. L. REv. 370, 396.
Insincere Zoning of Entire Municipality for Agricultural or Large Minimum Lot
Size Use. At the first impact of the outward urban development, communities often
react quite directly, simply, or primitively in their desire to check growth. In
Waukesha county and elsewhere, officials have been known to zone an entire town
for agricultural use without having any sincere intention of excluding commercial or
residential use. This was done to enable the granting or denying of petitions for
commercial or residential zoning according to the nature of the proposed develop-
ment and the possible effect upon taxes. Spot zoning of the most illogical type has
resulted and either the original zoning or the pattern of spot zoning, or both, might
well be considered to be illegal because based on no comprehensive plan. However,
this type of an indirect freeze on development can be defended where it is based on
a comprehensive plan, on the ground that the comprehensive plan must consider
the impact of the tax rate occasioned by excessively rapid development. Ibid.
It should be noted that counties frequently use the "agricultural" zone for the same
purposes as do municipalities. In these instances, the term "agricultural" is a misnomer
in that the district frequently includes many uses other than and often inconsistent with
farming. The purpose of such regulation is the control of the urbanization of previously
undeveloped areas. See, e.g., Mang v. County of Santa Barbara, 182 Cal. App. 2d 93,
5 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1960) ; Kotrich v. County of Du Page, 19 Ill. 2d 181, 166 N.E.2d 601
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plication between rural-county, and urban-municipal zoning ordinances,
the utility of county zoning is limited as an instrument for regulating and
resolving the problems of urban sprawl and development."8
The most logical unit for the planning and regulation of urban growth
and development would seem to be one whose jurisdiction is not circum-
scribed by existing municipal boundaries but is instead coextensive with
the geographical impact of the forces and problems of urbanization. Metro-
politan and regional planning commissions have been authorized by several
state legislatures, yet "present practice ... leaves such plans as might be
drawn up by regional and metropolitan planning commissions in a state of
suspended animation, entirely devoid of legal effect."4" These plans are
virtually without means of implementation and thus afford no better method
for coordinating the allocation of regional land resources than does the
county zoning ordinance."0 Though there may be justification for not per-
(1960); County of Cook v. Glasstex Co., 16 Ill. 2d 72, 156 N.E.2d 519 (1959)
Kaczorowski v. Elmhurst Chicago Stone Co., 10 Ill. 2d 582, 141 N.E.2d 14 (1957);
County of Du Page v. Henderson, 402 Ill. 179, 83 N.E.2d 720 (1949).
48. See Bartelt, supra note 9, at 374:
[Clounty or rural zoning .... has functions different from those of typical urban
zoning. Of course, it is not a perversion of its purpose if it is used in a manner
complementary to urban zoning .... Unless those charged with the responsibility of
county zoning, however, are sympathetic with the objectives of urban zoning (some-
thing not very much in evidence at the moment), the likelihood of close cooperation
is somewhat remote. It is more likely that county zoning will reflect the attitudes of
rural residents (as undoubtedly it should in a democracy) ; if that attitude is one of
hostility toward what they believe to be undue restriction, county zoning will very
probably be of little aid to comprehensive planning and zoning. Ibid. (Footnotes
omitted.)
49. PooLEY, op. cit. supra note 13, at 36. For enumeration of states with Metropolitan
and/or Regional Planning Commissions see id. at 24-25, 25-28, nn.70 & 74.
50. In Metropolitan Planning Acts the commission is given advisory functions only.
The establishment of such a commission is purely a local matter, and is usually
optional. In other words these measures represent only a willingness on the part of
state legislatures to allow cooperative planning. They do not, whatever the recital
of legislative purpose may say, reveal in any of the states in which they have been
passed, a conviction of the state legislation that the state must itself assume some
responsibility for the adequate planning of large urban areas.
The Regional Planning Commission is a device for coordination planning within
a given area .... The commissions serve a purely advisory purpose, and have in
most cases no power at all....
A regional planning commission need not pay attention, so far as the scope of its
inquiry is concerned, to political boundaries.... It is, therefore, on paper at least,
a means which is particularly suited to the study if not to the solution of the
peculiar problems of metropolitan areas where a multiplicity of local government
units has hitherto precluded effective area-wide planning of land use. However,
when the statutory provisions governing the makeup and proposed role of the
regional planning commission are analyzed, one is led to the disappointing conclu-
sion that little fruitful work can be expected of it; and one's baleful expectations in
this regard are given added weight by the fact that although many states have for
some time had regional planning enabling legislation on their statute books, no
effective solution to metropolitan problems has been forthcoming....
No less than twenty-nine states had passed regional planning enabling acts by
1957. The statutes vary considerably. At one time California required the establish-
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mitting the centralization of the zoning power in a metropolitan, regional
or even state wide commission, the metropolitan and regional commissions
which have been created pursuant to state enabling acts have neither served
to coordinate local efforts to plan and regulate for the region, nor have they
been responsible for the formulation of a meaningful plan for the area
which they encompass.
III. SOLUTION-EXTRATERRITORIAL CONTROLS?
A. Extraterritorial Controls in Theory and in Practice-What
Kind of Solution?
Quite a different approach, and perhaps one which is less satisfactory in
theory, recognizes that most metropolitan areas essentially have mushroomed
ment of a regional planning commission in each of the several planning districts
into which the State Planning and Conservation Board must divide the state ....
Generally, the enabling statutes provide that a number of cities or counties can elect
to establish a commission, and the local units of government concerned are given
wide discretionary powers with regard to the method of selection of personnel to
serve on these bodies.... The commission, once established, is usually required to
p lan ... Most regional comissions, however, have no ... clear mandates from their
legislatures, and the planning which they are required to do is of the vaguest kind.
If a zealous commission were to inquire, for example, whether it was to consider
existing zoning regulations, subdivision standards, or offical maps, either in the sur-
vey or in the planning recommendations, there is no guidance to be had from the
statute. Is it to consider public development only, or should it attempt to forecast
possible future industrial development? ... There is a great deal of difference, how-
ever, between saying that a commission shall act in an advisory capacity only, and
saying that its labors shall be condemned to eternal uselessness. But this is precisely
what most regional planning statutes imply. For having charged the commission
with the preparation of a master plan, they are in the main, completely silent as to
what is to become of this document. There is sometimes a requirement that the
regional commission shall "encourage the cooperation" of other units of government
in carrying out the plan, or that it shall "distribute information relative to metro-
politan, regional, and community planning and zoning. ... ." New York is excep-
tional in requiring that where a county board of supervisors wishes to adopt or
amend a "county plan" (showing highways, parks, sites for public works, etc.), a
public hearing is to be held at which, among others, the regional planning com-
mission shall be heard. New York also provides that the regional planning com-
mission may recommend a comprehensive zoning plan to the governing bodies of
municipalities within its area. Such recommendations need not.., be accepted, but
at least there is some guidance here to the commission as to its proper function.
Moreover, a municipality which zoned in a fashion contrary to the commission's
recommendations might have some difficulty in persuading a court that its zoning
plan was reasonable in that it was a necessary part of the orderly development of
the region as a whole. Evidence of the regional planning commission's recommenda-
tions would presumably be evidence to which the court would attach some weight
in such a case.
This, then, is the present status of regional planning. As a concept it has not been
sufficiently well-defined, nor has its role in most cases been adequately explained;
its goals are, at best, vague, and often illusory. The advisor (to a family-a corpor-
ation-or a municipality) must, if his advice is to be valuable, know which things
can be changed, and which things cannot be changed. If he is supplied with this
information, and if his advice is sound, he may, without himself possessing any
powers, wield great influence. But in the context of many state enabling acts, the
advice of the regional planning commission may well seem to the recipient munici-
palities as inane and as meaningless as advice from a fortune cookie, and will re-
ceive as much attention. POOLEY, op. cit. supra note 13, at 24-28. (Footnotes
omitted.)
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from a core city which in most respects dominates the region, and which in
time either has or will annex much of the territory contiguous to it. In many
instances, it is the core city which supplies public facilities to the metropoli-
tan area and also serves as the major source of employment. It is not too
difficult to see that land uses in the vicinity of the corporate limits of the core
city affect the proximate growth of the city and, in turn, such outlying areas
feel the impact of the city's neighboring development. Perhaps, then, it is
possible to state a case for focusing in the core city itself authority to plan
and regulate for the entire metropolitan area; delegating to it extraterritorial
powers over the development of its progeny. Positing such control in the city
is predicated upon the region's substantial dependence upon the core city.
The core city frequently contributes to the existence of regional problems in
land use and for the most part, certainly in the event of annexation, directly
or indirectly shoulders the ultimate burden and responsibility for resolving
the developmental problems of those satellite communities which have re-
cently suffered the birth pains of rapid urbanization. It would seem that,
given the pre-eminent position of the core city, there is good reason for dele-
gating to it the major responsibility and authority for land use planning and
regulation within its own impact area." Though such suggestion undercuts
our notion that there cannot be government without representation and
though, in many instances, it would reduce considerably the significance of
local government within the impact area, it would, however, eliminate some
of the conflict, bickering and hard feeling which exists today and arises out
of the proliferation of communities with distinct territorial boundaries.
The delegation of such pervasive power to the core city, however, has not
been granted by any state government. Many states, in one way or another,
have invested cities with the power to influence extraterritorial land develop-
ment. Yet, in the main, the exercise of these extraterritorial powers has been
confined to regulating only the development of unincorporated areas within
a certain radius of the municipality's borders.5 2 Those extraterritorial
51. See SENGSTOCK, op. cit. supra note 8, at 67, 72. Sengstock concludes that extra-
territorial zoning will not succeed unless the core city is accorded a preferential position
in zoning for the metropolitan area. Specifically it will not work so long as it prevents
the extraterritorial zoning of incorporated areas; and generally: "Extraterritorial zoning
will prove ineffectual as a solution to metropolitan area problems unless core cities arc
empowered to zone the entire area, thereby rendering local governments within the rest
of the fringe meaningless." Id. at 72.
Where a core city is restricted by tiny incorporated suburbs in drafting its plans,
the growth of the metropolitan area in an orderly manner cannot but be impaired.
On the other hand, if the core city is allowed to develop a master plan for the
metropolitan area, would this not lead to the eventual extinction of other local
governments within that area? Id. at 63.
52. See notes 60, 61, 69, and 71 infra.
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powers which have been delegated to some communities have been largely
directed at the prevention of haphazard and conflicting development of
undeveloped areas adjacent to a city which cannot at present be annexed,
yet which one day may be annexed." Though limited extraterritorial
powers have been granted, it should be noted that only one 4 of the states
authorizing extraterritorial zoning has within it one of the top ten metro-
politan areas.5 However, in none of these states has there been any at-
tempt to focus regional land use control or planning in the core city by
according it a preferential position. In fact, extraterritorial controls do not
reflect either collective or coordinated metropolitan wide efforts to resolve
pressing or expected problems of urban growth." Such controls do little
more, if anything at all, toward effectuating the orderly development of
the metropolitan area than the aforementioned judicial test of reasonable-
ness which takes account of the extraterritorial impact of intraterritorial
zoning.
State legislatures have enabled municipalities to influence the develop-
ment of neighboring land by the delegation of three specific kinds of powers
-the power to plan,"7 the power to zone,"s and the power to approve sub-
53. But why extraterritorial zoning? Why not plan the urban fringe, but postpone
the imposition of use restrictions until annexation? ... By annexing large areas of
undeveloped land, a city perhaps could obviate the necessity for the exercise of ex-
traterritorial powers and still accomplish its planning objectives.... In addition to
the restrictions imposed by many of the annexation statutes, the courts have been
reluctant to give their approval to large-scale annexation of underdeveloped lands.
If foreseeable corporate use of the land cannot be shown--which often is the case
-annexation generally will be denied. This limitation upon the city's power to
annex sets the stage for haphazard development and the establishment of a myriad
of nonconforming uses .... If the city is precluded from annexing sufficient under-
developed land, and if it is further denied the right to eliminate noncomforming
uses after annexation, there must be other alternatives if long-range planning ob-
jectives are to be realized.
Bartelt, supra note 9, at 371-72. (Footnotes omitted.); see HoRAcsc & NOLAN, op. Cit.
supra note 38, at 58.
54. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 24, § 11-13-1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1965).
55. See SENGSTOCK, op. cit. supra note 8, at 65-67.
56. This is especially true where the metropolitan area is composed of numerous in-
corporated communities.
"When extraterritorial controls are exercised in an area of several municipalities,
which frequently characterizes metropolitan regions, their effectiveness is greatly de-
creased. They are not designed for coordinated planning for an area of several incor-
porated municipalities, since they apply only to unincorporated areas." Melli & Devoy,
supra note 17, at 67.
57. See notes 68-76, infra and accompanying text.
58. ALA. CODE tit. 37, § 797 (1959); ILL. ANN. STAT ch. 24, § 11-13-1 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1965) ; Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 100.097, .350 (1955); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 14-418
to -419, 16-901 (1943); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 15-902, -905 (Supp. 1963); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 160-181.2 (Supp. 1965); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 863.2 (Supp. 1965);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §§ 863.13, .19 (1962); TENN. CODE ANN § 13-711 (Supp.
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divisions, "' all of which are exercisable beyond their corporate limits. Con-
sidering first extraterritorial zoning and subdivision control, as previously
stated, these extraterritorial powers, when authorized, do not extend to land
located within another incorporated community,"0 are restricted to land
within a certain radius of the corporate limits of such municipality,"' and in
some instances can be exercised only in absence of an applicable county zon-
ing ordinance.6 2 Extraterritorial powers are not always given to all in-
corporated communities within a state. Many enabling statutes generally
make the size of a municipality decisive of whether any or how much ex-
traterritorial jurisdiction will be conferred upon it. " However, in the event
1965); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 62.23(7a) (Supp. 1966); see GA. CODE ANN. § 69-1203
(1957); IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 53-753 to -754 (1964). The status of extraterritorial zoning
in Indiana is somewhat unclear. See IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 53-734, -753 to -754 (1964).
59. ALA. CODE tit. 37, §§ 798-800 (1959); ARiz. Rv. STAT. ANN. § 9-474 (Supp.
1965) ; ARK. STAT. ANN. § 19-2829(c) (Supp. 1965); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 11528;
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 139-59-12 (1963); CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 8-25 (Supp.
1963); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 177.10 (1943); GA. CODE ANN. § 69-1203 (1957); HAwAIn
REv. LAWs §§ 149-185, -187 (1955); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2503A (1957); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 24, § 11-12-5 (Smith-Hurd 1962); IND. ANN. STAT. § 53-745 (1964); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 373.12 (1949); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-705 (1964); Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN §§ 100.088, .097, .360 (1955); MD. ANN. CODE art. 66B, §§ 24-25 (1957); MiGH.
STAT. ANN. § 5.3003 (1958); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 471.29 (1963); NEB. REV. STAT. §§
14-116, 15-901 (1943) ; NEv. Rnv. STAT. § 278.340 (1963) ; N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-2-23
to -24 (1953); N.D. CENT. CODE § 40-48-18 (1960); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 711.09
(Page Supp. 1965); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, 863.2 (Supp. 1965); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
fit. 19 §§ 863.9, .19 (1962); ORE. REv. STAT. § 227.110 (1959); S.C. CODE ANN. § 47-
1038 (1962); S.D. CODE § 45.3311 (Supp. 1960); TEx. Rav. Civ. STAT. art. 974a
(1963); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 15.1-467 to -468 (1964); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3962(16)
(1961); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 236.02(2), .10 (1957).
60. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 863.19 (1962) (zoning); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 66.32 (1965); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 236.02(2) (1957) (subdivision approval).
61. The radial limitations that have been placed upon extraterritorial zoning have
ranged from one to five miles. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 37, § 797 (1959) (five miles);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 16-901 (1962) (one mile for cities of the first class).
The range of radial limitations imposed upon subdivision control has been from one
to six miles. See, e.g., NEB. REv. STAT. § 16-902 (1962); N.D. CENT. CODE § 40-48-18
(1960).
Such territorial limitation is not, however, always expressed in terms of miles. See
Kentucky's use of the concept of "municipal area." Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 100.010,
.350 (1955).
62. See Butler v. City of Little Rock, 231 Ark. 834, 332 S.W.2d 812 (1960); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 13-711 (Supp. 1965); ef. GA. CODE ANN. § 69-1203 (1957) (counties
and municipalities must jointly agree on the boundaries of their respective jurisdiction).
63. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160-181.2 (Supp. 1965); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 236.02(2),
263.10(1) (b) (1957). The North Carolina statute authorizes extraterritorial zoning for
cities only with a population of 1,250 or more. Similarly, concerning subdivision approval,
the Wisconsin provisions afford a different treatment of fourth-class cities (approved
within a radius of one and one-half miles of corporate limits) as opposed to the author-
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the extraterritorial jurisdiction of two municipalities overlaps, the problem
is resolved most often without regard for the respective size or rate of
growth of such communities but instead by a determination that "the
jurisdiction of each such municipality shall terminate at a boundary line
equidistant from the respective corporate limits of such municipalities."6
Because the extraterritorial power to zone or control subdivision approval is
not tantamount to annexation, the aforementioned solution to the problem
of overlap may produce the absurd result of one community exerting ex-
clusive extraterritorial control over the development of an unincorporated
area, while a neighboring community grows into the area reserved for such
exclusive control. Overlap may also occur where municipal extraterritorial
controls are not precluded by the existence of county regulations which ap-
parently apply to the same unincorporated areas. One state has resolved this
specific kind of conflict by requiring local compliance with the more restric-
tive regulation.'
The scope and effectiveness of extraterritoral zoning and subdivision con-
trol is limited. These limitations are for the most part embodied in those
enabling statutes which authorize extraterritorial exercise of police power by
municipalities. It is clear from a reading of these statutes that the power to
zone and approve subdivisions beyond a municipality's corporate limits is
directed primarily at controlling the development of unincorporated areas on
the fringe of a municipality."6 This has prompted one writer to say that
"extraterritorial zoning will prove ineffectual as a solution to metropolitan
area problems unless the metropolitan core cities are accorded a preferential
position to zone territory in other incorporated areas."6" Apart from a
municipality's inability to zone within a neighboring incorporated com-
munity, of major importance is the fact that in none of the enabling statutes
ity given to cities of the first, second and third classes (approved within a radius of three
miles of the corporate limits).
64. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160-181.2 (Supp. 1965) (zoning). See also, Wis. STAT. ANN.
, 66.32 (1965) (subdivision approval). For an extensive discussion see Melli & Devoy,
supra note 17, at 60-61.
65. See Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 236.10(4), .13 (1957). For an extensive discussion see
Melli & Devoy, supra note 17, at 61.
For a case which illustrates the potential conflict between a city and county zoning
ordinance, see Walworth County v. City of Elkhorn, 27 Wis. 2d 30, 133 N.W.2d 257
(1965). For a statement of the case see note 84 infra.
66. See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3962(16) (1961) (subdivision control limited to land
which actually abuts the municipality).
67. SENGSTOCK, EXTRATERRITORIAL POWERS IN THE METROPiLITAN AREA 67 (1962).
By contrast, it is said that the limitation of extraterritorial control to unincorporated
areas has merit for "to give municipalities the power to zone effectively in one another's
territory would defeat the whole purpose of local government and lead to anarchy."
POOLaY, PLANNING AND ZONING IN THE UNITED STATES 23 (1961).
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is a community accorded extraterritorial jurisdiction which is, by the terms
of such legislation, co-extensive with the impact area undergoing urban
development. For these reasons, neither extraterritorial zoning nor sub-
division controls affords any meaningful solution to the massive land use
problems brought on by rapid regional growth. However, the fallacy of
extraterritorial zoning and subdivision controls as a method for promoting
orderly regional development is still more basic. Such controls are insular
in nature, affording only a measure of security to the component com-
munities of the region. They are not predicated upon and do not require a
creative and joint effort in fashioning the orderly development of an entire
metropolitan area. By contrast, such an exercise of the police power is a
unilateral act, protective of only the regulating community's self interest.
This is so because no municipality invested with such extraterritorial power
is burdened with the responsibility for securing the ordered development of
the entire region. However, it should be noted that this might not be so if
the core city's power to regulate encompassed all of the communities it had
spawned.
Most states have passed enabling legislation which authorizes the prepara-
tion of a comprehensive plan for land use development within and beyond
the corporate limits of their respective communities."8 Mileage limitations
appear in some of the enabling legislation, " but in other statutes the author-
ity to plan extends to areas which in the judgment of the planning commis-
68. ALA. CODE tit. 37, § 791 (1959); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 19-2825, -2827 (1) (Supp.
1965); CAL. Gov'T CODE § 65300; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 139-59-6 (1963); GA.
CODE ANN. § 69-1203 (1957); HAWAII REV. LAWS § 149-184 (Supp. 1961); IND. ANN.
STAT. § 53-734 (1964); IOWA CODE ANN. § 373.9 (1949); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
12-704 (1964); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 100.097, .350 (1955); MD. ANN. CODE art. 66B,
§ 15 (1957); Micir. STAT. ANN. § 5.2996 (Supp. 1965); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 471.26
(1963) ; MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 11-3801, -3830, -3830.1, -3831 (Supp. 1965) ; NED.
REv. STAT. §§ 18-1302, -1306 (1943); NEv. REV. STAT. § 278.150 (1963); N. H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 36:13 (1955); N.J. REv. STAT. § 40:55-1.11 (Supp. 1964); N.M. STAT.
ANN. §§ 14-2-18, -23 (1953); N.Y. GEN. MuNc. LAW § 237; N. D. CENT. CODE § 40-48-
08 (1960); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 713.02 (Page Supp. 1965); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
19, § 863.2 (Supp. 1965); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 863.7 (1962); ORE. RED. STAT.
§ 227.090(9) (1953); PA. STAT. ANN. fit. 53, §§ 39003, 46147 (Supp. 1965) ; PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 53, §§ 12129, 22765, 30653 (1957) ; S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 47-1029, -1072, -1075
(1962) (§ 47-1028.1 excepts planning commissions in Greenwood County); S.D. CODE §
45.3305 (Supp. 1960); TENN. CODE ANN. § 13-503 (1956); Tnx. REV. CIv. STAT. art.
1011m (Supp. 1965); UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9-20 (1962); VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-455
(1964); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 523 (1961); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 62.23(2) (1957).
69. The radial limitations on extraterritorial planning which are expressed in miles
vary from one and one-half to six miles. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 19-2827 (1) (Supp.
1965) (five miles); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 24, § 11-12-5 (Smith-Hurd 1962) (one and
one-half miles); ORE. REV. STAT. § 227.090(9) (1953) (six miles).
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sion "bear relation to the development of the municipality... ."" To avoid
conflicting municipal plans, the power to plan extraterritorially is confined
to unincorporated areas. 1 With respect to such unincorporated areas, the
problem of overlap in the planning jurisdiction of two or more municipalities
is resolved similarly to an overlap of authority to approve subdivision plats.72
However, because planning is advisory in nature and produces no direct
legal consequences itself, the likelihood of a territorial dispute arising over
planning jurisdiction between neighboring communities is indeed remote.
For this same reason, it is highly unlikely that a court would find municipal
authority to plan extraterritorially unconstitutional even if it comprehended
incorporated as well as unincorporated areas. Nonetheless, no city has been
expressly given the authority to plan for an entire metropolitan area or
within the boundaries of an incorporated community. The ordered develop-
ment of a region or metropolitan area inevitably requires some centralization
of the planning function-at the very least, the effort to plan effectively
necessitates the cooperation of all affected communities. Such cooperation
is difficult to achieve when a primary city or cities is or are hemmed in by
fringe suburbs. In the main, the responsibility for area planning has been
diffused--each community to itself-the greater the proliferation of tiny
70. E.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9-20 (1962); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 62.23(2)
(1957). In Hawaii such planning can extend beyond a municipality's corporate limits
without restriction except that it cannot include areas zoned as forest or water reserves.
HAwAI REv. LAws § 149-184 (Supp. 1961).
71. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 24, § 11-12-5 (Smith-Hurd 1962).
Municipal planning serves as a declaration to the public at large of future land use
restrictions and developments; if conflicting master plans negated this key aspect of
planning, the principal advantage of planning would be lost. The possibility of
conflicting plans is real and immediate when two cities plan for the same area.
Therefore, many planning statutes expressly exclude extraterritorial municipal terri-
tory from a city's planning operations.
SENOSTOCK, op. cit. supra note 67, at 62-63.
It does seem difficult, however, to say that extraterritorial planning does serve as a
"declaration to the public at large of future land use restrictions and developments."
Most states authorize extraterritorial planning; comparatively few authorize extraterri-
torial zoning. It would seem that a declaration as to a course of action is not particularly
meaningful so long as there is no immediate prospect of the means by which such
course of action may be made operative. Thus, one can hardly say that "if conflicting
master plans negated this key aspect of planning, the principal advantage of planning
would be lost," when in most cases such principal advantage with respect to extraterri-
torial fringe areas is never present simply because extraterritorial controls are not
authorized along with the power to formulate a comprehensive plan. So long as this is
the state of affairs, there seems to be no reason why the core city, for example, should not
be given a pervasive power to plan for the metropolitan area-within and without other
corporate boundaries.
72. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 66.32 (1965). See also note 64 supra and accompanying
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muncipalities, the greater the diffusion. It is apparent that effective plan-
ning requires at least some focus of responsibility in a common planning
agency whether it be the core city or a metropolitan or regional plan com-
mission. Extraterritorial planning as such will not suffice. Furthermore, it
should be noted that though many states have authorized municipalities to
plan extraterritorially,73 a smaller number have empowered local communi-
ties to exercise extraterritorial control over subdivisions,"4 but only a few
states have sanctioned the use of extraterritorial zoning."5 What this means
is that more often than not a community, while able to project its land use
plan beyond its corporate limits, is unable to enforce such plan-in the end
such authority to plan extraterritorially is quite meaningless."
B. The Legality of Extraterritorial Regulation
Despite the fact that extraterritorial controls, as now authorized, promote
the ordered and efficient development of the region in only a very limited
way, they do serve to minimize the spread of those inharmonious external
land uses which inhibit and adversely affect the growth of the city. Without
more, this should be sufficient reason for examining the legality of such
measures. Additionally, to the extent that such examination raises substan-
tive and quantitative problems of constitutionality respecting the use of
extraterritorial controls generally, it also sheds light on the legality of any
proposal to invest in a core city the authority to plan and regulate the
development of the entire metropolitan area.
1. Generally
As stated previously, extraterritorial planning should not and has not
presented problems of constitutionality. This has not been true of the ex-
traterritorial regulation of land use, particularly zoning. The legality of any
municipal exercise of land use control over outlying incorporated com-
73. See statutes cited note 68 supra.
74. See statutes cited note 59 supra.
75. See statutes cited note 58 supra.
76. Bartelt, Extraterritorial Zoning: Reflections on its Validity, 32 NOTRS DAlu. LAW.
367, 369-70 (1957).
It is obvious that planning is entirely prospective.... The importance of planning
for the future is recognized by most enabling legislation. These statutes ordinarily
authorize planning commissions to plan the fringe area surrounding the munici-
pality. A planning commission, however, has only advisory functions. Unless there
is some power that can compel adherence to its determinations, the planner's ex-
quisitely drawn master plan is worth little more than something that might have
been. To make the master plan a reality is the function of zoning.
Cf. Melli & Devoy, Extraterritorial Planning and Urban Growth, 1959 Wis. L. R.v. 55,
65 (discussion of "prezoning").
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munities or over an entire metropolitan area has not been confronted for
the simple reason that it has not been authorized. Yet similar issues should
be raised in any examination of the constitutionality of the control of un-
developed unincorporated fringe areas." Such extraterritorial power over
adjacent unincorporated areas has been authorized and the matter of its
constitutionality has received the attention of several courts." In discussing
the legality of these measures, one must observe at the outset that we are first
considering a question which comprehends a great deal more than simply
zoning or subdivision controls. At the core of the problem is the police power
and its proper exercise. The measures used to implement a city's land use
plan nearly always find their justification in the police power.7" Several re-
lated questions arise whenever an authorized exercise of police power
stretches beyond the corporate limits of a municipality."0 Is it a violation of
due process to sanction the use of governmental powers without representa-
tion of those who are governed?"' Can there be any extraterritorial exercise
77. The two problems nonetheless present issues which do differ in degree. Control of
incorporated areas from without is probably a greater threat to local government than
such control of unincorporated areas. This is simply because incorporation usually signifies
a more advanced stage of local government-a local determination to govern oneself-an
assertion of all the powers which characterize local government. The power to regulate
has become an essential attribute of local government. To deny such a municipality this
function of government represents a serious threat to its corporate existence. For a dis-
cussion of this point see Conclusion infra.
78. American Sign Corp. v. Fowler, 276 S.W.2d 651 (Ky. 1955); Smeltzer v.
Messer, 311 Ky. 692, 225 S.W.2d 96 (1949) (zoning) ; Schlientz v. City of North Platte,
172 Neb. 477, 110 N.W.2d 58 (1961) (zoning); City of Raleigh v. Morand, 247 N.C.
363, 100 S.E.2d 870 (1957), appeal dismissed, 357 U.S. 343 (1958) (zoning); Pruden-
tial Co-op. Realty Co. v. City of Youngstown, 118 Ohio St. 204, 160 N.E. 695 (1928)
(subdivision approval); Walworth County v. City of Elkhorn, 27 Wis. 2d 30, 133 N.W.2d
257 (1965) (zoning).
79. This would seem to be true despite the fact that it is sometimes said that the re-
cording of a subdivision plat is not a right but a statutory privilege which can be con-
ditioned in a reasonable manner. See Ridgefield Lane Co. v. City of Detroit, 241 Mich.
468, 217 N.W. 58 (1928).
80. See Bartelt, supra note 76, at 396-409.
81. The exercise of governmental powers over the people embraced within any
area or territory, necessarily involves control to a very material degree over their
persons and property. The control in the present instance if given, not to any one
chosen or elected by the people over whom they are to exercise dominion, but to
the officers of a foreign body, chosen for the service of that body, and not for the
people to be affected by the powers given .... It would ... impose upon them the
whole burden of the police powers of the city, to be exercised for the benefit of the
latter, and thereby would they be caused to bear a weight borne by no other people
of the State .... But upon the general question we do not hesitate to say that the
legislature has no more power to take the property of one man and give it to a
corporation, municipal or otherwise, than it has to give his property to another
citizen; and no more has it power to impose burdens upon the citizen in favor of a
municipal corporation of which he is not a member than it has to impose burdens
upon him in behalf of another man who has rendered to him no equivalent.
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of the police power without the consent of those who are accordingly sub-
jected to such regulation? If such a regulation is not unconstitutional for the
foregoing reason, then does it bear a reasonable and substantial relationship
to the public health, safety, morals or general welfare? What kind of rela-
tionship must be established between the purpose of the regulation, its
scope, and the area which it circumscribes?
The perplexing problem is not so much whether the legislatures can
confer extraterritorial powers on municipalities, but how much power
may be conferred. More specifically, may legislatures authorize munic-
ipalities to exert broad extraterritorial zoning powers over relatively
large areas of unincorporated lands? 2
2. Zoning and Subdivision Controls
Before examining the judicial treatment of the foregoing issues which are
generally concerned with the extraterritorial exercise of the police power,
it should be noted that there have been comparatively few decisions which
have addressed themselves directly to the validity of the extraterritorial exer-
cise of land use controls."3 Several courts have decided the question of
constitutionality in favor of the extraterritorial exercise of the power to
Malone v. Williams, 118 Tenn. 390, 421-22, 103 S.W. 798, 806 (1907); see Smeltzer v.
Messer, 311 Ky. 692, 696, 225 S.W.2d 96, 98 (1949).
It is interesting to note that Kentucky, which extended the authority to zone extra-
territorially to the planning and zoning commissions of cities of the second class in Ky.
REmv. STAT. ANN. § 100.350(4) (1955), gives non-residents of the zoning municipality
who are subject to such regulation representation on the commission in Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 100.330 (1955). This is not true of cities of the third, fourth, fifth and sixth
classes. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 100.550, .610, .620 (1955). However, in the latter
case such commissions are not expressly authorized to zone extraterritorially. Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 100.500, .510 (1955).
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 100.330 (1955) (second class cities) reads in part:
(1) Each commission shall consist of five 'city members' who shall be citizens
and residents of the city, and two 'county members' who shall be citizens of the
county in which the city is located, residing outside the limits of the city....
(3) The county members shall be chosen in the following manner: The county
engineer shall be an ex officio member of the commission. The remaining member
shall be chosen by the fiscal court from persons not holding any other city or
county office.
Despite the statutory inclusion of non-resident representation on the commission, the
Kentucky Court of Appeals chose not to give the section setting out the scope of extra-
territorial jurisdiction an expanded reading. American Sign Corp. v. Fowler, 276 S.W.2d
651 (Ky. 1955). For a full discussion of this case see note 85 inlra.
82. Bartelt, supra note 76, at 388.
83. See note 78 supra; Malone v. Williams, 118 Tenn. 390, 103 S.W. 798 (1907).
Therein the Tennessee enabling act granted the city of Memphis the right to exercise all
governmental powers and police powers within two miles of its territorial limits. The
statute was found unconstitutional. Though authority to zone extraterritorally is itself
a broad exercise of the police power, the legislation therein obviously went considerably
further.
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zone.8 4 Several cases, though not clearly in point, have cast some doubt on
84. In City of Raleigh v. Morand, 247 N.C. 363, 100 S.E.2d 870 (1957), appeal dis-
missed, 357 U.S. 343 (1958), the Supreme Court of North Carolina upheld a local
ordinance which prohibited the construction and maintenance of a trailer camp in those
exclusive residential zones located both within the city of Raleigh and up to one mile
beyond its corporate limits. In so doing the supreme court sustained the decision of the
court below granting an injunction which required compliance with such ordinance. The
municipal ordinance in issue was enacted pursuant to state-enabling legislation authoriz-
ing extraterritorial zoning within one mile of a city's limits. The land use which violated
the city ordinance, herein, was located within one mile of such city's boundaries. The
property owners on appeal argued:
[T7hat their property lies in an area outside the City of Raleigh, not subject to
city taxes, peopled by nonresidents of the City of Raleigh, and receiving no benefits
from said city. Therefore, they contend that on the face of plaintiff's complaint the
ordinance sought to be enforced is unreasonable and arbitrary and cannot in any
way be said to further the general welfare of the City of Raleigh. Id. at 366, 100
S.E.2d at 873.
The court found:
1. That zoning ordinances have been upheld as an exercise of the police power and
that the exclusion of trailer camps from certain zones has generally been upheld as a
valid exercise of the police power.
2. 'The Legislature has unquestioned authority to confer upon the town authoritiesjurisdiction for sanitary or police purposes of territory beyond the city limits.'
'The legislature has power to confer on a municipal corporation police jurisdiction
over adjoining territory immediately next to and within a specified short distance
of the corporate limits.' Id. at 367, 100 S.E.2d at 873.
In Schlientz v. City of North Platte, 172 Neb. 477, 110 N.W.2d 58 (1961), a
property owner, owning land within one mile of North Platte's corporate limits, filed
suit against the city to enjoin it from enforcing a city zoning ordinance which extended
city regulations for one mile beyond its borders. The state enabling act authorized first-
class cities to zone extraterritorially the area one mile beyond and adjacent to their
corporate boundaries; provided, that no such ordinance shall prohibit or interfere with the
conduct of normal farming, livestock operations, existing businesses, or industry. The ex-
tended city ordinance classified plantiff's land as a residential zone. The trial court
entered judgment for the plaintiff finding that the state enabling act was unconstitutional.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Nebraska reversed the decision below and ordered
judgment for the defendants.
In its decision the court took note of the following facts: that plaintiff's land is
presently being used by him for residential purposes and the raising of livestock; that land
in the vicinity of plaintiff is used generally for one or both of the foregoing purposes; that
plaintiff had formerly operated an implement business on the premises, but this was dis-
continued before passage of the ordinance in question; that before the ordinance plain-
tiff's land was marketable, but afterwards realtors had told him his acreage was not
salable because of such ordinance; and that the city had not taken any action against
plaintiff nor interfered with his use of the premises-that plaintiff operated the premises
exactly as before passage of the ordinance. Plaintiff further testified that the ordinance
had caused "unpredictable damage" to his property. Id. at 483-84, 110 N.W.2d at 63.
On behalf of his position, plaintiff argued that:
[Tihe persons living in the area adjacent to and 1 mile beyond the corporate
limits of the city have no voice in the selection of elective officers and officials of
the city, which amounts to a disenfranchisement of such persons because they are
subjected to the jurisdiction of elected officers . . . whom they had no voice in
choosing, and therefore section 16-901, R.S. Supp., 1959, is unconstitutional. ....
Id. at 489, 110 N.W.2d at 66.
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The court replied:
Municipal corporations are creatures of the Legislature and endowed only with
the powers granted. .. by the Legislature. There is no doubt but that the Legisla-
ture may provide for their officers and officials and the manner of their selection
and appointment insofar as cities of the various classes are concerned....
Such persons as heretofore mentioned have neither a constitutional or inherent
right to local self-government. The Legislature may subject them to the jurisdiction
of officers for whom they have no voice in the selection. This does not constitute a
violation of any constitutional provision.... The officers and officials of the city are
not constitutional officers, but are such as are created by the Legislature, and which
the Legislature is empowered to so create. Id. at 489-90, 110 N.W.2d at 66-67.
(Emphasis added.)
In conclusion the court found:
The Legislature may, and often does, expressly or by implication, grant to
municipal corporations the right to exercise police power beyond and within a
prescribed distance of municipal limits....
Referring to section 16-901, R.S. Supp., 1959, the powers granted therein are
generally defined as pertaining to zoning. They are enactments under police power
of the state, and at most a partial or quasi extension of the corporate limits.
Both of these are legislative powers. There is nothing unreasonable about the area
included, as provided for by... [the enabling act or ordinance enacted pursuant
thereto]. We conclude that no principle of fundamental law is violated by enact-
ment of such statute and ordinance.
By the enactment . . . [of enabling act] it is apparent that the Legislature recog-
nized that cities of the first class in this state are growing and expanding. The
Legislature also recognized that the area within 1 mile of the corporate limits of
such cities in the future would doubtless become a part of the cities and that such
extention of the boundaries of the cities of the first class should, when required, be
permitted. The zoning laws and ordinances incident thereto . . . are generally for
the welfare and health of the citizens under the police power of the state. The
foregoing is apparently the reason for the enactment of [the enabling act] ....
Id. at 492-93, 110 N.W.2d at 68.
Query-whether the result would have been the same had the enabling act provided
for extraterritorial authority extending up to five miles beyond a city's corporate bound-
aries; had it not excepted livestock or farming operations or existing businesses and in-
dustry; and if the city had filed suit to enjoin plaintiff from continuing or expanding an
existing business or from carrying on farming operations.
In Walworth County v. City of Elkhorn, 27 Wis. 2d 30, 133 N.W.2d 257 (1965), an
action was filed by a county, a town, and a property owner against a city for a declaratory
judgment finding such city's interim extraterritorial zoning ordinance invalid and un-
constitutional. Pursuant to a state enabling statute, which conferred authority upon
fourth-class cities to enact an extraterritorial zoning ordinance extending to unin-
corporated areas one and one-half miles beyond the city's corporate limits, the city of
Elkhorn on February 24, 1964, adopted a resolution of intent to initiate an extraterritorial
zoning ordinance. On March 2, 1964, the city, pursuant to the same enabling act
which authorized the city to pass an interim zoning ordinance without first referring the
matter to the plan commission, adopted an ordinance which, in accordance with the terms
of the enabling act, declared:
[T]hat there should be prepared a comprehensive zoning ordinance for all of its
extraterritorial zoning jurisdiction, and ordered that existing zoning uses in such
extraterritorial zoning jurisdiction should be preserved in force and effect while the
comprehensive zoning plan was being prepared. Under the provisions . . . [of the
enabling act], this interim zoning ordinance was effective for a period of two years
after its enactment. Id. at 32, 133 N.W.2d at 259.
Since 1946, the county had had a zoning ordinance, which was amended in 1962.
Such amended ordinance was approved by 14 of 16 towns within the county, one of
which was the town in which plaintiff's property was located. Plaintiff's farm lands were
also situated within 1'/ miles of Elkhorn's city limits. On January 31, 1964, plaintiff
applied to the county zoning supervisory board to have his land rezoned from an agri-
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the legality of such legislation,"5 while at least one court has expressly upheld
cultural district to part of the general business district. On March 17, 1964, the county
board adopted such amendment and the town approved it on March 23rd. On March
24th plaintiff applied to the county for permission to locate a liquor store on his land.
This use was not authorized in agricultural districts, but since plaintiff's land was now
zoned for general busness, his application was approved on April 3, 1964. Such approval
produced a direct conflict with Elkhorn's interim zoning ordinance which had frozen
those uses permitted as of March 2nd, and as of that date, plaintiff's land was zoned for
agricultural purposes only.
The circuit court found the interim ordinance void because the city of Elkhorn had not
obtained the necessary consent of the county board of supervisors. On appeal, the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin reversed, and found as follows:
1. In the light of the legislative history of the enabling act and after carefully con-
struing such statute, such interim ordinance was not void. The city of Elkhorn was not
required to obtain this consent of the county board.
2. The ordinance was not unconstitutional.
Appellants have cited us to no case which directly holds that extraterritorial
zoning violates the equal-protection-of-the-laws and due-process clauses of the
Fourteenth amendment. Zoning ordinances have commonly been sustained on the
theory that they constitute an exercise of the police power.... The constitutionality
of extraterritorial zoning was recently upheld by the Nebraska Court in Schlientz v.
City of North Platte....
Our rapidly expanding population and the tendency of the greater portion of
our people to live in urban areas cause most cities from time to time to extend their
city limits into adjacent areas by annexation. Usually such annexations are pre-
ceded by the building of homes in adjacent agricultural areas by persons whose
employment is in the city. Many of these adjacent areas are often spoiled as future
first-class residence districts because of objectionable commercial or industrial
developments that have taken place in the absence of zoning. These undoubtedly
are the reasons which prompted the legislature to enact... (the enabling statute).
We hold that this act providing for extraterritorial zoning is a reasonable and valid
exercise of the police power.
The remaining question is whether the two-year freeze of existing uses is too
long to be reasonable. We hold that it is not. Plaintiff ... has not demonstrated
any undue hardship that would result to him during such two-year period. There
has been no showing that his property is unfit for the purpose for which presently
zoned. The fact that he may be prevented during this two-year period from erecting
and operating a liquor store is wholly insufficient to establish that the interim
ordinance is arbitrary or capricious. Id. at 37-39, 133 N.W.2d at 261-62.
85. In Smeltzer v. Messer, 311 Ky. 692, 225 S.W.2d 96 (1949), the Court of Appeals
found the provisions of an extraterritorial zoning ordinance unenforceable as against
property owners owning land within 32 miles of the zoning municipality. However, it
should be noted that this decision probably does not stand for the proposition that ex-
traterritorial zoning is unconstitutional per se, despite its inclusion of language which
questions the right of a city to regulate property owners who have no voice in its legisla-
tive policies. The court seems to recognize that the issue in this case was really one of
legislative authorization-noting that the power to annex underlies the exercise of extra-
territorial land use control.
In Smeltzer, a suit was brought by certain property owners seeking injunctive relief
against their neighbors. More specifically, they sought to have them remove a dwelling
house because its type and size violated the provisions of the nearby city's extraterritorial
zoning ordinance. The city was located in an adjacent county. There was apparently at
that time no clear statutory authorization by the state of such extraterritorial jurisdiction
for cities of a fourth class (the classification of the zoning municipality herein).
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Under KRS 100.500 the legislative body of a city of the fourth class is specifically
authorized to regulate and restrict the use and type of buildings. Interpreting that
section alone, there is a rather clear implication that the power granted is limited to
the territorial boundaries of the city. Section 100.610 authorizes the city to create
by ordinance a "City planning commission." Section 100.650 provides that the
commission "shall make and adopt a master plan for the physical development of
the city and municipal area." "Municipal area" is defined... as "the surrounding
territory which bears relation to the planning and zoning of the city." . . . KRS
100.660 sets out the purpose of the master plan, which is to envision the "future
growth of the city," the "harmonious development of the city and its environs,'
and the "promotion of good civic design and arrangement." Id. at 694, 225
S.W.2d at 97.
The defendants argued that the foregoing statutes clearly distinguished between the
authority of the commission to plan extraterritorially and the power of the municipality
to zone. The court, however, recognizing such a distinction, believed that it was un-
necessary for reaching a decision in this case. The narrow issue was whether a city of
fourth class had been granted authority to zone not only beyond its borders but in
another county as well. Put in other terms, because in the light of past decisions a city
of the fourth class cannot annex adjacent land of another county, a court herein must
decide whether a city can regulate the use and development of land without its borders
which it could not otherwise annex at any time-land which the city could not invade.
The court, in answer to such questions, found:
While it may be said that any municipality has an interest in its approaches, we can
find nothing in the statutes which grants the power to control the use of such out-
lying territory unless it may reasonably be contemplated that such territory will
eventually become a part of the city. The future expansion of its territorial limits
is a basic consideration the legislature apparently had in mind when enacting the
planning and zoning statutes. Since appellees' land cannot be absorbed under an-
nexation proceedings by the City... its use is not so reasonably related to the city's
development as to fall within the purposes shown by the statutes. We must bear in
mind that we are dealing with a police power. As a general rule, the exercise of
this power, delegated to a municipality, should be strictly construed, particularly
where it encroaches upon the rights of an individual. . . . Ordinarily, unless a
statute expressly provides otherwise, the exercise of a police power by a munici-
pality is limited to its territorial boundaries .... (I)f there is a reasonable doubt
concerning the power of a city, the doubt should be resolved against its existence.
The above principles are significant in this case because the city's action, if sus-
tained, seriously impairs the rights of a person owning property beyond its limits
who has no voice in its legislative policies, and who receives no legally recognizable
benefit to such property from the city government. Id. at 695-96, 225 S.W.2d at
97-98. (Emphasis added.)
Indeed the court's conclusions were undoubtedly affected by the statutory definition of
"municipal area" and the stated purpose of "master plans" which apparently circum-
scribed the authority of the planning commission to plan extraterritorially. The only clear
expression of extraterritorial jurisdiction to be found in both the statutes and the court's
opinion was in the commission's authority to plan.
In 1955 the Court of Appeals of Kentucky again took note of an implied statutory
limitation upon a municipality's power to zone extraterritorially-that it comprehends
only such territory as in the foreseeable future might be annexed. In American Sign
Corp. v. Fowler, 276 S.W.2d 651 (Ky. 1955), the court was asked to consider the
validity of certain zoning regulations as they applied to an unincorporated area within
Fayette County but some six miles beyond the city limits of Lexington. These regula-
tions were enacted jointly by the fiscal court of the county and the board of commissioners
of Lexington and prohibited the proposed erection of a drive-in theater on a parcel of
land located beyond the boundaries of Lexington. The circuit court upheld such regula-
tion finding that the fiscal court did have authority to zone all of Fayette County; but it
also found that Lexington did not have authority to zone the area in question-it being
beyond the "municipal area"-the area of foreseeable annexation. On appeal, the court of
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the extraterritorial exercise of subdivision controls.s" One commentator
has said:
appeals found that the fiscal court was not authorized to adopt county-wide zoning
regulations, and affirmed the circuit court's finding with respect to the extraterritorial
authority of the city of Lexington.
It is indeed worth noting the court's analysis of the problem of municipal authority to
zone extraterritorially. Such authority was said to be found in Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §§
100.320, .490 (1955) which pertain to cities of the second class. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §
100.320 (1955) provides: "Each city of the second class and its municipal area shall have
a planning and zoning commission." Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 100.350 (1955) (Powers of
Commission) provides: "The commission may .. . establish in the city and municipal
area zones or districts . . . ." Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 100.010(6) (1955) defines
"municipal area" as "the surrounding territory which bears relation to the planning
and zoning of the city."
First, the court noted its prior decision (Smeltzer v. Messer, 311 Ky. 692, 225 S.W.2d
96 (1949)), in which it said that "municipal area" is limited to such area as in the fore-
seeable future might be annexed, and that there was no statutory authority for extra-
territorial regulation beyond such ambit of annexation. Then, in response to the fiscal
court's contention that the issue of what area is related to the planning and zoning of
the city is a question of fact which was already decided by the commission, the court
stated:
We can agree that the question of what territory bears relation to the planning
and zoning of the city is one of fact, once it has been determined as a matter of law
what is meant by the phrase "bears relation to the planning and zoning of the city."
... It is our opinion that the phrase "bears relation to the planning and zoning
of the city" means just what it says-that . .. the territory must be so situated as
to have a bearing on the planning and zoning scheme for the city. A remote, ab-
stract relation to the economic, commercial or social interests of the city is not
enough. American Sign Corp. v. Fowler, supra at 655.
The court then found that the circuit court's declaration on "municipal area" was
correct. The circuit court had declared that "municipal area," beyond which zoning had
not been authorized, extended no further than the foreseeable ambit of annexation and
that a parcel of property six miles beyond the city limits was not within the "municipal
area" of Lexington.
Compare Malone v. Williams, 118 Tenn. 390, 103 S.W. 798 (1907). This case,
decided nearly twenty years before the United States Supreme Court first upheld the
general validity of zoning, involved an act authorizing Memphis to exercise all govern-
mental powers up to two miles outside the city limits. For a discussion of this case see
note 99 infra and accompanying text.
86. In Prudential Co-op. Realty Co. v. City of Youngstown, 118 Ohio St. 204, 160
N.E. 695 (1928), a subdivider, whose land was located within three miles of a city,
challenged such city's ordinance which provided for the examining, checking, and ap-
proval by planning commission of plats of lands located without the city but within three
miles of its limits and the payment of a fee before such city would indorse a plat and that
no plat could be recorded without such indorsement. Two state statutes appeared to
authorize such an ordinance.
OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 735.17 (Page 1953) (cited in the case as General Code §
4346) :
[W]hen any person plats any lands within three miles of the city, the commissioner
shall, if such plats are in accordance with the rules prescribed by him, indorse his
written approval on such plat. No plat of such land is entitled to record in the
office of the county recorder without such written approval so indorsed thereon....
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[S]ince there is some kinship, at least on the extraterritorial level, be-
tween subdivision controls (which appear to have weathered the
storm), and zoning (which still is dragging anchor)," one may spec-
The Legislature at a later date enacted OHio R y. CODE ANN. § 711.09 (Page 1953)
(cited in the case as General Code § 3586-1):
Whenever a city planning commission adopts a plan for the major streets or
thoroughfares and for the parks and other open public grounds of a city or any
part thereof, or for the territory within three miles of the corporate limits thereof or
any part thereof, . . . then no plat of a subdivision of land within such city or
territory shall be recorded until it has been approved by the city planning com-
mission and such approval indorsed in writing on the plat....
In upholding the validity of the city's ordinance and the power of the state legislature
to confer such power upon a city planning commission, the court made the following
points:
1. Both the city and surrounding territory are mutually dependent upon each other;
that the surrounding territory benefits from a city's activities and growth; that cities must
annex such territory from time to time to accommodate its need to expand; that a city's
obligation to provide adequate and safe streets extends to the established streets of an-
nexed territory; and that "all highway exits and entrances must necessarily traverse
the adjacent territory, and the statement that narrow streets and other obstructions with-
out limit may be established by suburban owners, and that the legislature is powerless to
intervene, is a travesty on justice and government." Id. at 213, 160 N.E. at 698.
2. Analogous exercises of extraterritorial police powers when authorized in this state
and others have been found constitutional. These exercises of the police power have in-
cluded the protection of territory outside of a city to insure cleanliness and to prevent
activities which are likely to contaminate the city's water supply;-the establishment of
extraterritorial quarantines to protect residents from epidemics or contagious diseases; the
regulation and location of houses of detention and hospitals for contagious diseases be-
yond city limits;--the inspection of dairies located without the city but which sell milk
within it;-and the extension of final jurisdicton of police courts over misdemeanors to
within four miles of city limits (jury may consist wholly of residents within the city).
Given a legislative authorization of such municipal exercise of extraterritorial police
power, without which a city could not arrogate to itself the right to regulate people or
property beyond its municipal borders, the only issue is one of legislative power.
Legislation has conferred upon cities regulatory powers over adjacent territory for
so long a period, in so many jurisdictions, and in such a variety of matters, that the
general principle has become firmly established, and, the question being one of
legislative power, the inquiry must relate to the reasonableness of the regulation, and
the justifiable question is whether the regulatory authority conferred has a reasona-
ble relation to the governmental purpose to be served. If it has such reasonable
relation, it becomes only a question of legislative wisdom with which the courts have
no concern. Id. at 212, 160 N.E. at 698.
Such a reasonable relation existed herein between the governmental purpose, as ex-
pressed in OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 711.09 (Page 1953), and the regulatory authority
conferred upon cities. See also Petterson v. City of Naperville, 9 I1. 2d 233, 137 N.E.2d
371 (1956).
87. Subdivision controls are indeed used to complement zoning in implementing a
comprehensive plan for a community and in assuring the orderly development of un-
developed areas. Because of the presence of conditions concerning streets, utilities, parks
and sometimes dedication of space for educational facilities, they frequently afford greater
control over residential development than that which is ordinarily achieved by a zoning
ordinance.
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ulate that the courts are in the process of becoming more liberal in
their approach to the concepts of planing, an attitude which forecasts
calm seas for zoning cases of the future.... ."
However, another commentator has been reluctant to find meaningful
precedent in the subdivision cases concerning the future of extraterritorial
zoning."s
The most recent cases on extraterritorial zoning have upheld its con-
stitutionality. However, they should not be deemed conclusive. Although all
of the recent cases in point have sanctioned the use of extraterritorial zoning,
and although those cases which have appeared to hold otherwise are clearly
distinguishable, in none of these decisions has a court examined in detail the
complex problems of constitutionality inherent in extraterritorial zoning.
Furthermore, in each of these opinions the courts have chosen to ignore those
factors which might distinguish zoning from other exercises of the police
power-factors which may call for a quite different result upon further
analysis. Consequently, one must conclude that those cases which have
spoken out on the legality of extraterritorial land use controls do not by
themselves furnish any reliable basis for predicting the future success of
extraterritorial zoning before the courts."0 A search for precedent and yard-
sticks of constitutionality must press onward. Indeed, those cases, other
than zoning, which deal with the extraterritorial exercise of the police power
Nonetheless it should be noted that:
Superficially, subdivision controls are designed to prevent fraud (reasonable as-
surance to the purchaser that he is getting the amount of land he bargained for),
and to insure the existence of an adequate street system, parks, sewers, etc. It has
little to do with land use. Under many of the statutes, the controls apply only when
the land is platted. In other words, they are conditions precedent to the recording
of the plat, but there are few restrictions against selling parcels by metes and
bounds. And, of course, without zoning restrictions, the purchaser can put the land
to whatever use he chooses. Bartelt, supra note 76, at 394 n.89.
88. Bartelt, supra note 76, at 395-96.
89. Courts should have no more difficulty sustaining the constitutionality of extra-
territorial subdivision control than in upholding extraterritorial planning. Re-
cording a plat is not a right but a state granted statutory privilege. If the state
conditions the privilege in a reasonable manner, no claim of unconstitutionality
would be seriously entertained. Obtaining the approval of the planning com-
mission of a nearby city as a condition precedent to recording a plat is not un-
reasonable if it is borne in mind that cities do expand their boundaries with the
passage of time. SENOSTOCK, op. cit. supra note 67, at 68.
90. A search for additional precedent is not important simply for purposes of ap-
praising the future success of extraterritorial zoning. The conclusion that, as presently
constituted, it is likely to encounter judicial opposition in many states is not particularly
helpful by itself. So long as extraterritorial zoning serves some useful function, and in-
deed it does, and so long as the bulk of extraterritorial zoning ordinances are still to be
drafted, it is absolutely essential that the latent facets of unconstitutionality be understood
and exposed to careful analysis. For indeed, it would be foolhardy for a state or munici-
pality to subscribe blindly to the format of others if there is the slighest indication that
such legislation lingers on the brink of disaster. To recognize such constitutional limita-
tions and to draft around them is indeed the virtue of an "in-depth" inquiry into the
legality of extraterritorial zoning.
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generally91 shed considerable light on anticipated questions of con-
stitutionality." These "cases indicate quite conclusively that there are no
constitutional inhibitions precluding the legislatures from giving municipal-
ities authority to exercise the police power extraterritorially in a limited
way."93
3. The Exercise of the Police Power-Important Precedent
The arguments which can be marshalled against those who object to the
extraterritorial exercise of the police power because it denies a fundamental
right to representation have been summarized as follows: 4 This is not
government without the consent of the governed, for such necessary consent
is manifested by their representation in the state legislature;"s since the state
91. For example, such exercises of the police power have included: the regulation of
liquor traffic; the inspection and licensing of dairies; the inspection, licensing and loca-
tion of slaughterhouses, the prohibition of pig sties and other unquestioned nuisances; the
prevention of water pollution, etc. It is always possible to say that the regulation of
business always affects the use and enjoyment of land. Yet such legislation is, in the
main, substantially different from the kind of land use control by a zoning ordinance. It
is nearly always directed at a specific problem-a specific use; i.e., it is limited and nar-
row in scope at its inception. Moreover, it is invariably prompted by an immediate and
pressing problem and is hardly ever prospective. This cannot be said of the modern
application of zoning and subdivision controls.
92. But see Bartelt, supra note 76.
All of these (ordinances), of course, are related to police power objectives; and if
they have been sustained, so then perhaps should zoning. There is, however, the
possibility that the courts might consider a comprehensive zoning ordinance that
imposes general restrictions over land use in a wide area in anticipation of possible
future problems quite differently from ordinances that are relatively narrow in scope
and directed toward an existent and immediate problem. Police power restrictions
antedated zoning by a considerable length of time, and the courts may not be
entirely receptive to the contention that since specific extraterritorial restrictions
have been sustained, extraterritorial zoning ordinances should be accorded the same
respect and treatment. Id. at 390.
93. Id. at 388-89 (Emphasis added.); see, e.g., Lutz v. City of Crawfordsville, 109
Ind. 466, 10 N.E. 411 (1887); State v. Rice, 158 N.C. 635, 74 S.E. 582 (1912).
Though many states have enacted legislation authorizing municipalities to exercise
certain extraterritorial police powers, comparatively few cities have exercised such powers
when granted. For a chart listing such legislation state by state see SENosroCo, Op. cit.
supra note 67, 52-54.
The fact that local governments are reluctant to use extraterritorial police powers
may be explained by an awareness upon their part of the practical difficulties in the
enforcement of such power beyond the corporate limits. Invasion of noncorporate
territories through police regulations would create very strained relationships be-
tween officials in charge of those areas and city administrators.... Id. at 55.
94. See generally Bartelt, supra note 76, at 396-404.
95. Granted that there shall be no government without the consent of the governed,
the argument is enhanced but little, since the governed have given their consent
through their representation in the legislature. The difference between legislative
authorization for a particular purpose, such as regulating liquor sales beyond the
corporate boundaries, on the one hand, and authority to exert a more general
power, such as zoning, on the other, is one of degree only, at least so far as the
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legislature is supreme in its exercise of the police power, it can confer such
power upon local authorities and prescribe a jurisdiction for its proper
exercise as the legislature sees fit;9" and finally, a municipality, though it
may appear otherwise, is a composite of incongruent jurisdictions; that is,
for a particular purpose the state legislature may exercise its discretion to
establish a municipal jurisdiction which is not synonymous with such
municipality's corporate limits." The proposition that the extraterritorial
exercise of the police power as such is not a violation of due process-
government without representation-has found support in a number of
decisions." Yet the important guiding principle to be drawn from such
precedent is that these same courts are likely to stop short of sanctioning an
unlimited exercise of these powers.
We have seen that, ex necessitate, a limited police power may be
granted to municipalities over a small section of country surrounding
their boundaries for their protection against nuisances, and to safe-
guard the health of the people residing in them; but even this is hard to
representation question is concerned. If the former is not in violation of fundamen-
tal rights, the latter should be considered of equal compatibility. Bartelt, supra note
76, at 400.
96. A side door approach to this problem of representation is premised on the
axiom that the legislature is supreme in matters of local government, a doctrine
qualified only by constitutional limitations....
This approach is admirably suited to the zoning problem. The city councils could
be considered as the delegates of the legislature for the purpose of zoning a district
to include the particular municipality and as much of the fringe area as the
legislature deems proper and necessary. This would logically stop any argument
based on lack of representation, for it is extremely doubtful that the legislature's
right to exercise the police power for zoning purposes, and the further right (given
proper standards) to delegate it would be questioned. Bartelt, supra note 76, at
400-02.
97. It is predicated upon the accepted notion that the situs and extent of a
municipality's boundaries are within the absolute discretion of the legislature. Exer-
cising this discretion, the legislature can-and does-establish multiple limits within
which the city may operate for particular purposes. For example, there can be one
boundary for political purposes, another for schools, and still another for streets and
sewers. Using this approach, it can be argued that the legislature can establish the
municipality's corporate limits for zoning purposes at a point different from its
limits for political purposes. Bartelt, supra note 76, at 402-03.
98. See, e.g., Jourdan v. City of Evansville, 163 Ind. 512, 72 N.E. 544 (1904) ; State
v. Rice, 158 N.C. 635, 74 S.E. 582 (1912); Malone v. Williams, 118 Tenn. 390, 103
S.W. 798 (1907).
Particular attention should be paid to Schlientz v. City of North Platte, 172 Neb. 477,
110 N.W.2d 58 (1961)-an extraterritorial zoning case. Therein the court concluded
that residents of the state have no inherent or constitutional right to local self-government
and that the state legislature can subject them to the jurisdiction of officers in whose
selection they have no voice. See City of Raleigh v. Morand, 247 N.C. 363, 100 S.E.2d
870 (1957) (an extraterritorial zoning case). Implicit in this court's upholding the
ordinance was a repudiation of the appellant's contention that the ordinance was un-
reasonable because it subjected non-residents to regulation without benefit. Cf. Smeltzer
v. Messer, 311 Ky. 692, 225 S.W.2d 96 (1949).
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justify on any principle other than that the municipality is in such
matters the agent of the state itself for the protection of the people of
the state. But that agency cannot be used as a basis for conferring
power upon municipalities over territory outside of them any further
than bare necessity requires. Certain it is there can be no justification
for extending over an outside strip of country, two miles in width, or of
any less width, all the governmental powers of the city, or even all the
police powers of the city."
Many existing enabling acts do authorize broad and seemingly unlimited
extraterritorial exercises of the police power. "' However, virtually all of the
decisions upholding the constitutionality of enabling acts, despite the
generality of much of the language in these opinions,"'1 involved cases in
which the scope of either the statute or the ordinance was limited." 2 In one
case in which the enabling grant of authority was on its face a broad one-
"that all ordinances . . . 'in the exercise of police powers given to it for
sanitary purposes or for the protection of the property of the city, shall
apply to the territory outside of said city limits within one mile of same in
all directions' " 0 3-- the ordinance in question was not nearly as far reach-
ing--"it shall be unlawful ...to keep any hogs or pigs within the cor-
porate limits of the city of Greensboro or within one-fourth of a mile of
said limits."'0 4 For the most part, then, the enabling legislation and/or
municipal ordinances which have survived judicial scrutiny have been con-
fined to specific matters of health, safety and morals extending but a short
distance beyond the municipality's corporate limits. In the main, they have
been directed towards nuisances and other activities which are likely to
99. Malone v. Williams, 118 Tenn. 390, 420-21, 103 S.W. 798, 806 (1907).
It is certainly clear that a state in pioneering legislation conferring extraterritorial
police powers, in the absence of specific judicial decisions directly on point, is
treading on dangerous grounds. When the grant of powers is unlimited, the
statute is apt to be declared unconstitutional. The territorial limitations will sway
the courts in their decisions. It is submitted that limited but broad grants of
power will also be stricken by the courts. SENOSTOCK, op. cit. supra note 67, at
50-51.
100. See chart prepared by SENGSTOCK, Op. cit. supra note 67, at 52-54. Though
most states have legislation which is limited to the control of uses (nuisances) which
might affect the health, safety, and morals of a municipality's inhabitants, eight states
have authorized in some form the full use of the police power. This has not necessarily
meant that municipalities in these states have chosen to exercise such broad authoriza-
tion. See note 93 supra.
101. City of West Frankfort v. Fullop, 6 Ill. 2d 609, 613, 129 N.E.2d 682, 685
(1955); Lang v. Sanitary Dist., 160 Neb. 754, 71 N.W.2d 608 (1955); Bartelt, supra
note 76, at 389.
102. See SENGSTOCK, Op. cit. supra note 67, at 50 & n.168; Bartelt, supra note 76,
at 386-94.
103. State v. Rice, 158 N.C. 635, 74 S.E. 582 (1912).
104. Ibid.
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affect the well-being of the inhabitants of the municipality itself. For ex-
ample, such legislation has authorized the regulation of slaughterhouses,
the sale of liquor beyond city limits, activities which might pollute water
or spread disease, sewage, pig sties, etc. 1' The powers authorized or ac-
tually exercised were hardly broad or sweeping. They have been largely
protective in nature and have been inspired by the presence of existing
and immediate problems which were narrow in scope. In almost every
instance it has been possible to conclude that the enabling legislation has
conferred no greater power on the municipality "than bare necessity re-
quires."
4. A Method of Analysis-The Future of Extraterritorial Zoning
What use then can be made of the foregoing opinions concerning the
extension of a city's police power, particularly zoning, beyond its corporate
limits with respect to developing a framework for understanding and pre-
dicting judicial reaction to extraterritorial zoning? To begin with, in the
abstract one can probably expect the courts to continue to affinm the exercise
of police powers beyond city limits without the representation or consent of
those affected; provided of course such authority has been conferred upon
the municipality by the state legislature. This being so, the significant issue
becomes how much and what kind of an extraterritorial exercise of the
police power will be permitted." 6 Or to put it another way, to what extent
and in what manner must legislatures and municipalities adhere to the
warning of the courts that such exercise must be limited? Therefore, it is
with respect to these matters that it becomes necessary to enumerate those
factors which are likely to influence the courts in deciding the fate of extra-
territorial zoning."'
a. the scope and substance of the ordinance. First-one must consider
the scope and substance of the controls embodied in such legislation. To
what extent do they curtail a land owner's free use and enjoyment of his
property? Are our notions of what constitutes an unreasonable restriction
at all affected by the fact that the impact of such regulation is extraterritorial
rather than intraterritorial? Zoning may be subjected to the same kind
105. See cases and ordinances cited in Jourdan v. City of Evansville, 163 Ind. 512,
72 N.E. 544 (1904); State v. Rice, 158 N.C. 635, 74 S.E. 582 (1912).
106. Practical considerations aside, the concept of extraterritorial zoning, as such,
should not find the courts hostile. This obviously does not imply, however, that
the power of either the legislature or the municipality will be unlimited. It does
mean that the law relative to what is and what is not permissible will be
developed by a case to case process through the media of variances, exceptions
and amendments, all of which are encompassed by the word "reasonable." Bartelt,
supra note 76, at 403-04.
107. See id. at 404-09.
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of territorial limitations as an ordinance which controls the location of
slaughterhouses, the quarantine of a communicable disease, or the sale
of liquor; yet, however limited geographically, zoning is, in substance,
a comprehensive and broad grant of extraterritorial power. Zoning ordi-
nances may regulate matters of land use, the height and area of buildings, lot
size, and even in some cases the architectural design of permitted struc-
tures."0 8 The breadth and subject matter of these controls alone may be
sufficient to warrant finding an extraterritorial zoning ordinance virtually
unlimited and accordingly unreasonable. Consequently, the scope of an
ordinance, that is the extent to which it pervades the existing fabric of land
usage, and the kind of uses prohibited or permitted by it, may yet determine
the outcome of a particular case.'
In Schlientz v. City of North Platte,"' for example, the court upheld both
the extraterritorial zoning ordinance, which classified as residential a prop-
erty owner's land situated beyond North Platte's boundaries, and the
enabling state statute, which authorized first class cities to zone the area one
mile beyond and adjacent to their corporate limits; provided, no such
ordinance prohibited or interfered with the conduct of normal farming,
livestock operations, or existing businesses or industry. This case arose out of
a suit filed by such property owner to enjoin the enforcement of the city
zoning ordinance. However, the city had made no attempt to interfere with
either the activities of plaintiff or his neighbors who were currently using
their land for residential, fanning and/or livestock purposes. The ordinance,
though not entirely innocuous, presented no serious threat to plaintiff's free
use and enjoyment of his land. Essentially, it did little more than zone for
the preservation of existing uses."' At most, the ordinance affected the ease
108. POOLEY, op. cit. supra note 67, at 84-90; Dukeminier, Zoning for Aesthetic
Objectives: A Reappraisal, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 218 (1955).
109. It is true, of course, that the regulations of land use in the urban fringe
very often are considerably less restrictive than they are in the municipality itself.
It is common to preserve the status quo, which usually means agricultural and resi-
dential uses. The courts may be more inclined to sustain an ordinance which
permits rather liberal land use than they would be if the ordinance were compar-
able to those in effect within the municipality. . . . How much restriction is
reasonable restriction within the ambit of the police power, very probably will be
determined by application of the accepted standards, qualified negatively by the
element of extraterritoriality and its various facets, and positively by the coming
of age of foresightedness. Bartelt, supra note 76, at 409.
See Walworth County v. City of Elkhorn, 27 Wis. 2d 30, 133 N.W.2d 257 (1965)
(interim zoning ordinance preserved existing uses).
110. 172 Neb. 477, 110 N.W.2d 58 (1961). For a statement of the case see note
84 supra.
111. See Walworth County v. City of Elkhorn, 27 Wis. 2d 30, 133 N.W.2d 257
(1965). The ordinance in question ordered existing zoning uses ("agricultural") pre-
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with which plaintiff might market his property. Given the facts of this case,
the territorial limits of the ordinance, and the exclusions of the enabling
statute, it is understandable why the court had so little difficulty in uphold-
ing the constitutionality of such legislation. However, despite the strong
language of this decision in support of extraterritorial zoning,'12 one cannot
be certain of how this same court would have reacted to legislation which
contained no exclusions regarding prevailing land uses in the area and also
severely restricted private discretion concerning the development of such
outlying areas-for example-a restriction to residential development only,
on minimum lots of three acres. Though such court might find reasonable
an intraterritorial ordinance which curtails the expectations and operations
of a developer to subdivide into lots of less than three acres, it might find
the extraterritorial application of this same kind of ordinance unreasonable
and arbitrary; especially if such extraterritorial coverage exceeded one mile.
Furthermore, though courts have upheld intraterritorial zoning ordinances
intended to advance or preserve residential property values by the imposition
of minimum lot or dwelling size requirements, and zoning ordinances in-
tended to make feasible the provision of necessary public services and facili-
ties at a reasonable tax rate by controlling the timing, location and content
of new development or by the creation of districts zoned for exclusive indus-
trial use," 3 these same courts might find such ordinances unreasonable when
stretched beyond a city's corporate limits. Such legislation must be justified
principally as an exercise of the police power for the general welfare of the
public. Perhaps this will not suffice. It may be that courts will sanction only
those extraterritorial controls which are clearly founded upon the protection
of the public health, safety and morals; regulation intended to prevent pri-
marily those discordant land uses which may have a deleterious effect upon
neighboring development. For example, the courts may be quite willing
to uphold an ordinance which curtails an outlying property owner's ex-
pectations of commercial and industrial use because such development
served, pending preparation of a comprehensive zoning plan. The court found:
"Plaintiff . . .has not demonstrated any undue hardship that would result to him dur-
ing such two-year period. There has been no showing that his property is unfit for the
purpose for which presently zoned." Id. at 39, 133 N.W.2d at 262.
112. Schlientz v. City of North Platte, 172 Neb. 477, 489-90, 492-93, 110 N.W.2d
58, 66-67, 68 (1961).
113. E.g., Lionshead Lake, Inc. v. Township of Wayne, 10 N.J. 165, 89 A.2d 693
(1952), appeal dismissed, 344 U.S. 919 (1953); Josephs v. Town Bd., 24 Misc. 2d
366, 198 N.Y.S.2d 695 (Sup. Ct. 1960). For a discussion of the Wayne Township
case, see Haar, Wayne Township: Zoning for Whom?-In Brief Reply, 67 HARV. L. RtEv.
986 (1954), Haar, Zoning for Minimum Standards: The Wayne Township Case, 66
HARV. L. REV. 1051 (1953); Nolan & Horack, How Small a House-Zoning for Mini-
mum Space Requirements, 67 HARv. L. REv. 967 (1954).
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would present a serious threat to the safety and health of those who live
immediately within and without the zoning municipality. They may, how-
ever, be unwilling to sanction the dedication of outlying land to industrial
use only in anticipation of local needs. Yet to circumscribe the permitted
control of land use in this manner may very well thwart the fulfillment of a
major objective in the regulation of fringe areas. 114
b. timing and the question of necessity. Second-one must consider the
timing of a municipality's decision to regulate beyond its corporate limits.
This is a question of necessity. Over how large an area must a city regulate
and how soon is it necessary for it to do so? It is indeed the issue of neces-
sity which underscores the all important determination of whether an ordi-
nance has a reasonable and substantial relation to the public health, safety,
morals or general welfare.
Early zoning legislation, which was exclusively intraterritorial, was
directed at preserving the integrity of development which had already taken
form. It was not intended to contribute to new patterns of development. Its
primary function was to protect existing development from the encroach-
ment of injurious and discordant land uses. The rapid expansion of urban
areas following World War II marked a dramatic change in growth pat-
terns. The role of land use regulation changed accordingly. It became a
useful device for shaping and controlling new development so as to satisfy
community needs and community goals. It focused upon the future; no
longer did it reflect simply the status quo. As a logical consequence of this
shift in emphasis, the frontiers of new zoning techniques were to be found
in substantially undeveloped areas rather than in the fully matured com-
munity.
As stated previously in those cases in which the police power was
successfully exercised extraterritorially, the problems remedied were largely
existent, not prospective. The detrimental effect of the uses regulated or
114. Restriction of outlying areas to simple residential or agricultural classifications
may be quite adequate in those instances in which the primary purpose of extrater-
ritorial zoning is the prevention of conflicting land usage, i.e., the exclusion of
industrial uses for the protection of neighboring residential development. Yet extra-
territorial zoning ought to serve a purpose which may comprehend something more
than the public health, safety and morals. It ought to serve whenever necessary as a
device for controlling fringe development in accordance with a community's ability to
supply necessary public facilities and services. Most important it ought to be used to
maximize the benefits to be achieved from the development of land resources. This may
involve or require the exclusion from designated areas of certain uses which have no
apparent deleterious effect upon neighborhood development; that is, it should facilitate
the allocation of necessary land resources to industrial use by the exclusion of all resi-
dential development. In theory, such an ordinance cannot usually be supported as
simply an exercise of the police power for the public health, safety and morals.
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prohibited was immediate and deserving of immediate action. In some of
the instances in which extraterritorial zoning measures will be proposed, one
can expect that the land use problems which warrant regulation will be
immediate and not anticipated; for example, where the fringe area has been
or is rapidly being developed, and especially where such development is
currently inimical to proximate and existing development within the
municipality. However, most often the fringe area will be largely un-
developed. The need for regulation of such areas is then essentially prospec-
tive in nature-it must rest upon events of the future.'15 It is founded upon
judgments as to the kind and timing of anticipated development, the prob-
lems expected to be generated by such development, and the needs of the
community. Despite the fact that courts have generally upheld intra-
territorial zoning of substantially undeveloped areas, the case for doing so is
not an easy one," 6 and in addition, courts have stressed the importance of a
comprehensive plan founded upon anticipated events and problems of the
reasonably foreseeable future."' Unlimited speculation as to the future has
not served as a sufficient basis for restricting the use of undeveloped land. In
fact, one court has gone so far as to hold that "the test of validity is not
whether the prohibition may at some time in the future bear a real and
substantial relationship to the public health, safety, morals or welfare, but
whether it does so now.""'  Not unexpectedly, the problem of futurity is
compounded when it concerns the regulation of land beyond the borders of
the zoning municipality. Indeed, courts may treat differently the zoning of
undeveloped land within and without the municipality." 9 Finding a need to
115. Bartelt, supra note 76, at 408.
[I~n most of the cases in which extraterritorial police regulations were sustained, the
uses regulated or prohibited had, or would have had, a present inimical effect,
whereas extraterritorial zoning purposes to control something which might in the
future have such an effect if the municipality grows to the projected size.
116. See Reps, The Zoning of Undeveloped Areas, 3 SYvAcusE L. RaV. 292 (1952);
Note, 30 U. CINc. L. REv. 297 (1961).
117. Bartelt, supra note 76, at 404-06.
118. Gust v. Township of Canton, 342 Mich. 436, 442, 70 N.W.2d 772, 774-75
(1955); accord, Christine Bldg. Co. v. City of Troy, 367 Mich. 508, 116 N.W.2d 816
(1962).
119. The courts could very well consider zoning of unincorporated areas as being
quite different from zoning annexed lands, although they both may be rural in
character. Annexation assumes necessity, and necessity presupposes development
within the reasonably foreseeable future. The courts always have been decidedly
antipathetic toward speculation. Secondly, but directly related, the amount of land
encompassed by an extraterritorial zoning ordinance can be infinitely greater than
that involved in most cases in which ordinances zoning undeveloped lands were
challenged. Development of land situated on the three-mile periphery of the extra-
territorial jurisdiction of a municipality is in the rather remote future. This would
be especially true of a small or medium-sized city, unless there was an indication
of a coming boom in oil, steel or uranium .... Whether it is reasonable for a
small town to control an area sixteen times its size is the type of question with
which the courts will be faced. Bartelt, supra note 76, at 406-07.
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support the regulation of undeveloped areas without the corporate limits of
a municipality would seem to require greater reliance upon the assumptions
and facts expected to be borne out by the future. Because the extraterritorial
zoning of substantially undeveloped areas will be in issue in almost every
case, one can expect to find the courts reluctant, if not unwilling, to gaze
into their educated crystal balls. They may indeed place a premium upon
immediacy. Thus, it has been said that:
In order to legitimatize the concept of extraterritorial zoning, the
courts very probably will have to formulate new criteria of reasonable-
ness. These will require a greater emphasis on foresight and develop-
ment in futuro, with the concomitant acceptance of opinions and
advice of experts, speculative though they may be. 2'
Assuming, however, that the courts will not reject summarily the extra-
territorial zoning of undeveloped land as unreasonable and premature
regulation, the resolution of the question of necessity reflects a consideration
of several related problems. To date it appears that extraterritorial zoning
has been devoted largely to controlling the development of those fringe areas
which are likely to be comprehended by the growth of the municipalit,
within the foreseeable future. In the main, it has been an exercise of the po-
lice power on behalf of the zoning municipality's present and prospective
residents. Despite the fact that it is difficult to find the foregoing limitation
embodied in existing enabling legislation,' 2' one court, in construing its en-
abling statute, found no legislative authorization to zone beyond that which
would be annexed within the foreseeable future. 2 Nevertheless, most courts
which have been given an opportunity to adjudicate the legality of extra-
territorial zoning have at least emphasized the fact that the notion of
prospective annexation underlies such broadened exercise of the police
power. 2 ' Whether this concept of prospective growth reflects a constitu-
120. Id. at 407-08.
121. Nearly all of these statutes impose geographical limitations upon such extra-
territorial authority. In the main then, these statutes permit extraterritorial control of
only a relatively small area, especially if one excepts incorporated areas from the scope
of such regulation. At the very least one can say that such territorial limitations are im-
posed without regard to the existence or size of the metropolitan area or region. Indeed,
these statutes have in no way conferred authority to legislate beyond a city's corporate
limits generally for the needs of an entire metropolitan area. However, though these
statutes, subject to the foregoing geographical limitations, expand the zoning munici-
pality's jurisdiction over a relatively small area, there is nothing in the language of any
of these statutes which expressly confines the exercise of such power to the area of fore-
seeable annexation. See statutes cited note 58 supra.
122. American Sign Corp. v. Fowler, 276 S.W.2d 651 (Ky. 1955); see Smeltzer v.
Messer, 311 Ky. 692, 225 S.W.2d 96 (1949). For an extensive discussion see note 85
supra.
123. See cases cited notes 84, 85, 122 supra.
By the enactment of section 16-901, R. S. Supp., 1959, it is apparent that the
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tional limitation as well, is indeed subject to conjecture; this is so simply
because the courts have not as yet had to face up to such issue." 4 We can,
however, say this much-that up until now they have sanctioned legislation
which does not appear to have stretched the police power beyond that area
which falls within the zoning municipality's ambit of foreseeable annexation.
Thus, one must bear in mind when reviewing the notion of foreseeable
annexation as a possible limitation upon the power to zone extraterritorially,
Legislature recognized that cities of the first class in this state are growing and
expanding. The Legislature also recognized that the area within 1 mile of the
corporate limits of such cities in the future would doubtless become a part of the
cities and that such extension of the boundaries of the cities of the first class
should, when required, be permitted. The zoning laws and ordinances incident
thereto relating to the regulations of buildings . . . are generally for the welfare
and health of the citizens under the police power of the state. The foregoing is
apparently the reason for the enactment of section 16-901, R. S. Supp., 1959.
Schlientz v. City of North Platte, 172 Neb. 477, 493, 110 N.W.2d 58, 68 (1961).
124 A decision concerned with statutory construction may sometimes go beyond the
matter of statutory authorization and by implication shed considerable light upon the
question of constitutionality. This is especially so if a court is impelled to construe a
statute most favorably in the presence of constitutional limitations. Indeed, it is pos-
sible to conclude that in Kentucky, the constitutional limits of extraterritorial zoning
are synonymous with the scope of existing enabling legislation. See American Sign Corp.
Fowler, 276 S.W.2d 651 (Ky. 1955) ; Smeltzer v. Messer, 311 Ky. 692, 225 S.W.2d
96 (1949).
In both these cases the court of appeals was confronted with the application of the
term "municipal area." Such term was defined by statute to mean "the surrounding
territory which bears relation to the planning and zoning of the city." There was
nothing in the statute itself which suggested any limiting notion of foreseeable annexa-
tion. Yet in both cases, without any mention of or reliance upon legislative history, the
court restricted "municipal area" to such area as might fall within the corporate limits
of the municipality within the foreseeable future. In American Sign Corp. v. Fowler,
supra, the court emphasized that the territory must bear relation to the planning and
zoning scheme for the city itself. Apparently then, land which would be comprehended
by the growth of the city within the foreseeable future would bear relation to the city's
planning and zoning simply because it would one day become a part of such city. Such
regulation bears relation to the planning and zoning of the city itself since it is in reality
nothing more than advanced zoning of the future city. This would not be so if such
area was located beyond the area of foreseeable annexation.
As a matter of simple statutory construction such conclusion does not seem sound
absent any clear expression of legislative purpose. It is obvious that land use within an
adjacent municipality can "bear relation" to or affect the planning or zoning of its
neighbors. There is much to be said for a literal construction of the definition of
"municipal area" which would seem to be founded upon a notion of land use impact. It
was precisely this construction which the court rejected. Such conclusion seems ill
founded unless the court was construing the enabling statute in the light of an implicit
constitutional limitation of foreseeable annexation. If such limitation existed the court
was bound to construe the statute in such a way as to preserve its constitutionality. How-
ever, this reason, if indeed it was the basis for the court's decision at all, was never ex-
pressed in either case. Yet one might predict in the light of these two decisions that
foreseeable annexation will become a test of constitutionality in the state of Kentucky
when and if such issue is litigated.
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that in terms of what courts have actually said or decided, this subject has
been raised as a matter of legislative purpose or authorization and not as a
matter of constitutionality.
Of what importance then will be the notion of annexation or ambit of
prospective growth in deciding the constitutionality of a particular ordi-
nance? Because the courts have said so little, one must recognize that it be-
comes exceedingly difficult to separate intelligent conjecture from artful
rumination of what ought to be. Nonetheless, as we shall see, such an
attempt is essential to understanding the problem of timing and necessity.
To begin with, it should be noted that at the heart of this matter of con-
jecture is the "public" for whose benefit the police power must be exercised.
Not only have the states failed to authorize municipalities to zone extra-
territorially for the benefit of the regional public, but there is good reason
to believe that the courts would balk at approving legislation so broad.
Though cities may and sometimes must account for the needs and facilities
of the regional public when formulating intraterritorial zoning ordinances
which satisfy a test of reasonableness, this does not mean that such public
interest will serve similarly as a basis for permitting a municipality to stretch
its police power beyond its boundaries and assume the role of big brother.
This much is clear-decisions which have upheld extraterritorial exercise of
the police power have stressed that such power may not be unlimited. It
would indeed be difficult to demonstrate any significant limitation upon such
power if the public, and consequently the authority to regulate, encompassed
an entire region. Thus, the "public," for purposes of evaluating the need to
regulate, is likely to be and perhaps ought to be that which is embraced by
the municipality itself. This then rules out regionalism as a likely alternative
to forseeable annexation.
At this point one must observe the impact extraterritorial land use may
have upon the development of a municipality. A city must supply public
facilities and services to lands within its borders; it must also legislate for the
health, safety, morals and general welfare of its public. Land use patterns
affect the city's performance of these responsibilities.12 Poorly designed and
constructed roads and private thoroughfares aggravated by "scattered and
125. For example,
Scattered Development-Growth occurs in a patchwork pattern, making the pro-
vision of adequate transportation and services costly and difficult to administer.
Corridor Development-Growth occurs along major roadways choking them with
traffic and encouraging strip concentrations of businesses and residences which are
difficult and expensive to serve.
Compact Development--Growth occurs around existing cities and/or around
completely new towns, allowing maximum use of all facilities and creating a sound
basis upon which to anticipate future needs. EAST CENTRAL FLORIDA REGIONAL
PLANNING COUNCIL, PRELIMINARY REGIONAL PLAN 18 (1964).
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corridor development" invariably become a municipality's millstone upon
annexation. Thus, a municipality may wish, quite justifiably, on behalf of its
present and prospective public, to preset the land use patterns of areas
which will be comprehended by its growth in the foreseeable future and
which it must one day serve. The impact and need to regulate may be
described as advance intraterritorial zoning. It appears, in the light of the
several decisions upholding extraterritorial zoning and their discussion of
legislative purpose, that advance intraterritorial zoning is constitutional.
Even if, however, an area falls without a city's ambit of foreseeable growth
or annexation, its land use patterns may have a substantial impact upon the
development of a nearby city. Proposed extraterritorial industrial develop-
ment may conflict with adjacent residential growth within the city. It may
also generate serious traffic problems even if it lies several miles beyond the
municipality's border. Though courts will on occasion afford the city a
measure of protection against such dangers, -1 2 1 they have done so only when
asked to review the reasonableness of a zoning ordinance which authorizes a
land use which does not harmonize with the prevailing land use of its
neighbors.12 Absent such judicial protection, a city justifiably may wish to
foster harmonious land development immediately within and without its
corporate limits. It may wish to serve its immediate public needs by the use
of an extraterritorial protective zone. Such zone may or may not extend
beyond the ambit of foreseeable annexation. Though there is nothing in the
decided cases which suggests that the courts are about to distinguish between
advance intraterritorial zoning and the use of an extraterritorial protective
buffer,125 one may anticipate that the latter is likely to give the courts some
difficulty on occasion. To begin with, in theory at least such zoning con-
stitutes the regulation of an outlying public primarily by and for the benefit
126. See Borough of Cresskill v. Borough of Dumont, 28 N.J. Super. 26, 100 A.2d
182 (L. 1953), aff'd, 15 N.J. 238, 104 A.2d 441 (1954). For a discussion of the prob-
lem of conflicting uses in adjacent municipalities as it bears upon the reasonableness of
a particular ordinance see note 18 supra and accompanying text.
127. If there is no county zoning ordinance which authorizes such conflicting use,
the city is left without a basis for contesting the action of the developer.
128. In a particular case it may be different for a court to make a factual distinction.
An enabling statute and local ordinance may authorize a city to zone extraterritorially
for one mile beyond its borders. Though this area may be within the ambit of prospective
annexation, such carte blanche authorization suggests that there are some cases in
which it may not. Even so, the immediate concern of the city may not be problems
which might arise upon annexation but rather protection of existing development within
the municipality. A court may decide the reasonableness of the extension of jurisdiction
to zone without ever concerning itself with whether the city has imposed a protective
buffer or zoned in anticipation of annexation. This should be especially true where the
extraterritorial jurisdiction falls within the ambit of future growth.
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of another-the city. Moreover, the need to regulate would always seem to
be greatest with respect to that which a city ultimately must serve. Self-
preservation and protection do not rest upon as solid a foundation of
necessity. Finally, since the need to protect really depends just as much
upon the kind of land involved as opposed to the proximity of such use, a
truly protective zone does not always lend itself to an easy and uniform
geographical demarcation.'29 Consequently, courts may choose not to up-
hold the use of extraterritorial buffers especially when they are intended to
protect areas not yet a part of the city proper. Advance extraterritorial
protective zoning should encounter some problems of constitutionality not
just because a city is ordinarily not burdened with the responsibility for
serving and securing the welfare of a public which may never become part of
its civic design, 3' but rather because in the end such notion may justify
virtually unlimited territorial jurisdiction to protect the city's present and
prospective public-a judgment which places even greater reliance upon the
uncertain future. Yet absent such element of futurity, a municipality ought
to be permitted to impose an extraterritorial buffer arising out of an im-
mediate need to protect its present public quite apart from whether such
area will ever fall within the municipality's corporate limits. Practically
speaking, however, the area encompassed by such an extraterritorial pro-
tective zone will seldom reach beyond the ambit of prospective municipal
growth and development except in those special situations in which a city is
prevented by law from annexing land proximate to its borders. 1
129. Land use impact is a variant of the kind and proximity of the use in question.
Usually extraterritorial jurisdiction is measured in terms of uniform and fixed radial
limitations without regard to the subject matter of such regulation. Some variation in
jurisdiction may exist according to the size of the zoning municipality, but none as to
particular land uses. Such a legislative scheme may serve the purpose of protection in
the many cases in which concentric circles of restricted land use are intended to insulate
the municipality against conflicting land development. This kind of regulation, intended
to inhibit varying intensities of development, works well regarding land uses whose land
impact is primarily a variant of proximity. Yet because such radial limitations express
primarily the factor of proximity, one cannot expect such system to impose an adequate
protective buffer against uses whose impact reflects not proximity but the nature of the
use itself. For example, a one-mile extension should permit the city to protect itself
against hazardous industrial uses. But such limitation is really without meaning regard-
ing a drive-in theater, ball park or other traffic generator located on a highway affecting
a municipality several miles away.
130. This does not mean of course that the city can zone intraterritorially in complete
disregard of the well being of its neighbors. For a more extensive discussion see note 21
supra and accompanying text.
131. See Smeltzer v. Messer, 311 Ky. 692, 225 S.W.2d 96 (1949). Therein the court
noted that since a city of a fourth class could not annex adjoining lands located in an-
other county, it could not zone such lands.
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The foregoing discussion not only imposes some fundamental restrictions
upon the utility of extraterritorial zoning,1 "' but also brings into sharp
focus a latent weakness in the use of fixed radial limitations to carve out a
municipality's zoning jurisdiction. The fact that a municipality anticipates
and wishes to control development of outlying areas is not in and of itself
enough to establish a case for necessity. It must be such development as will
affect the public for whose health, safety, morals or general welfare the
municipality must legislate. If the reason for an extended exercise of the
police power is advance intraterritorial zoning, then the growth rate of the
zoning municipality itself looms as a matter of vital importance, and this
is often, though not always, a function of its present size. Indeed it is the
anticipated growth of the community which provides the essential link
between land use and the need to regulate. Extraterritorial zoning ordin-
ances have usually expressed this relationship in terms of an inflexible
quantitative limitation; that is, the power to zone up to one mile, two miles,
etc., beyond a city's corporate limits. Occasionally a state will classify its
cities according to population and then vary its delegation of authority to
zone extraterritorially accordingly. Nevertheless, even in that case the radial
limitations for each respective municipality remain fixed and uniform within
each classification. Such a demarcation of extraterritorial jurisdiction then
constitutes a formal expression of the anticipated growth of the municipality
and its need to regulate. If made without regard to the size of a community,
it is no expression at all. If made without regard for the growth rate of a
particular community, it is at best a crude approximation of the need to
regulate. Furthermore, if a protective buffer is the reason for an extension
of the power to zone, the use of inflexible radial limitations ignores com-
pletely the fact that land use impact is a variant of both proximity and kind
of use. Indeed in a particular case the subject matter of outlying develop-
ment may be all important and to confine a municipality's extraterritorial
jurisdiction to a defined geographical area may afford it too little or too
much protection. Thus, the outright delegation of arbitrarily determined
and uniform extraterritorial jurisdiction quite possibly may weaken the claim
of necessity and reasonableness, and consequently, the case for the con-
stitutionality of both the enabling statute and the ordinance may also be
weakened. To be sure this exercise of the police power cannot be un-
132. See Smeltzer v. Messer, supra note 131. The court therein considered the in-
ability of the zoning municipality to annex at any time the property in question as a
matter of critical importance in construing the state enabling statute. See also American
Sign Corp. v. Fowler, 276 S.W.2d 651 (Ky. 1955).
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restricted, but the use of radial limitations is at most a half-hearted attempt
to take heed that the police power must be limited.133
Finally, the imminency or urgency of a need to regulate is nearly always
a reflection of the kind of problem to be remedied by the application of
extraterritorial land use controls. Once again, the subject matter of an
ordinance may be of critical importance. One can probably say that a need
is apt to be recognized more readily by the courts if a particular ordinance
can be justified as an exercise of the police power on behalf of the public
health, safety, and morals. For this reason an ordinance which curtails the
use of land for a liquor store3 or industrial purposes by permitting resi-
dential or agricultural use only, is apt to receive more favorable treatment
than an ordinance which regulates the architectural design of permitted
structures. The case for establishing a need to regulate is made more
difficult when advancement of the general welfare serves as the only basis for
exercise of the police power. Public health and safety ought to occupy a
higher place on the scale of community values than the creation or preserva-
tion of property values. If this is so, it is only natural that the courts will
view an external threat to the public health as more serious and more urgent
than the intrusion of external development which jeopardizes the mainten-
ance of local property values.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, several points should be emphasized concerning the resolu-
tion of regional land use problems and the utility of extraterritorial zoning.
First, extraterritorial zoning has not been nor will it ever be entirely
successful in fulfilling its apparent objective-controlling the development
of the fringe area. To begin with, its jurisdiction is nearly always limited
to a predefined geographical area which may or may not be synonymous
with the need to regulate extraterritorially. Furthermore, enabling statutes
133. A quite different approach has been taken by the state of Kentucky-one which
this author regards as sensible. Cities of the second class have been empowered to zone
within their "municipal area." Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 100.350 (1955). "Municipal
area" is defined as the "surrounding territory which bears relation to the planning and
zoning of the city." Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 100.010 (1955). This approach has the
virtue of flexibility. It expressly avoids the problems posed by the use of fixed and
uniform radial limitations. Indeed, it approximates the standards of constitutionality sug-
gested in the text. To be sure, the concept of "municipal area" does not advance a no-
tion of unlimited extraterritorial jurisdiction. Quite the contrary, it serves as a realistic
and meaningful limitation of extraterritorial power. However, it should not be concluded
that this author favors the limitation drawn by those Kentucky cases which have con-
strued this statute. See American Sign Corp. v. Fowler, supra note 132.
134. See Walworth County v. City of Elkhorn, 27 Wis. 2d 30, 133 N.W.2d 257
(1965).
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authorizing the exercise of the power to zone extraterritorially have restricted
its application to unincorporated areas immediate to the municipality. If a
municipality is isolated-surrounded by uncontrolled, undeveloped and un-
incorporated land--extraterritorial regulation does permit a municipality to
secure itself against conflicting and deleterious land uses."' However, if a
metropolitan area consists of a patchwork of incorporated communities, and
this is today almost always the case, its utility is negligible. There may be
no fringe area which can be zoned simply because it is incorporated, or the
state legislature may have arbitrarily allocated extraterritorial powers to
neighboring communities without regard to community needs or rate of
growth. Moreover, it is doubtful that any statutory revision would enhance
the utility of extraterritorial zoning. It appears that the courts have upheld
and will uphold the legality of extraterritorial zoning when it is confined to
those insubstantial fringe areas which are likely to be comprehended by the
future growth of a zoning municipality or when it curtails development
which otherwise would conflict with existing uses. How much further courts
will go in permitting the control of extraterritorial undeveloped land, a
matter predicated upon the acceptance of farsighted expectations, is still in
issue.
Second, extraterritorial zoning as authorized has not been and cannot be
used to promote the orderly and efficient development of a metropolitan
area. Its use reflects diffusion rather than essential centralization of author-
ity and responsibility. It neither necessitates nor encourages joint efforts to
plan and regulate regional growth; if anything, extraterritorial zoning per-
mits a local community to adopt self-serving answers to pressing problems
which may have regional ramifications." 6 The absence of any requirement
for a regional or metropolitan land use plan, which carves out a standard of
reasonableness to guide communities and courts alike, necessarily translates
extraterritorial zoning into largely self-protective regulation of fringe areas.
135. A sound argument for the use of extraterritorial zoning could be made with
respect to rapidly developing Brevard County, Florida-a county which was only re-
cently rural but has within the last fifteen years spewed forth urban growth and sprawl
with a vengeance. Most important is the fact that such urban growth has not resembled
that which usually characterizes the mature metropolitan area. It has lacked a con-
centration of new development reaching outward from a focal community. It does not
have a central city; indeed it is a collection of rapidly developing communities-a bundle
of population clusters, some of which are unincorporated. See Green, Urban Growth in
the Nation's Spaceport (1964) (unpublished report in Washington University Law School
Library).
136. Extrateritorial services and controls are not important as a means of meet-
ing the needs of, nor of relieving the pressure from, metropolitan government. Their
use may lead to jurisdictional conflicts, bickering and hard feelings, rather than to
cooperation between the governments of metropolitan areas. Jones, The Organiza-
tion of a Metropolitan Region, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 538, 542 (1957).
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Zoning beyond a municipality's corporate limits has not provided a panacea
for the massive regional problems of land use. These problems reflect the
actual interdependence of a region's member communities; extraterritorial
zoning is not a solution predicated upon the realities of such interdepend-
ence.
Concentration of extensive extraterritorial authority and responsibility in
the core city for the development of those communities which it has
spawned, may facilitate the resolution of metropolitan land use problems.
However, it is doubtful whether the courts would find such legislation
constitutional. Implicit in this proposal is a shift away from the cornerstone
of annexation which underscores existing extraterritorial controls-that the
public for whose health and safety such ordinance is enacted must fall within
the present or prospective ambit of the municipality's boundaries. The cry
of government without representation is likely to take on new proportions.
A finding of necessity will require a clear recognition of the power and duty
of a municipality to legislate on behalf of a public which comprehends the
entire, region. However, despite the fact that some courts have, when re-
viewing the reasonableness of an intraterritorial zoning ordinance, expressed
a willingness to view the matter of public need as coincidental with regional
need, they may not be receptive to legislation which confers upon a munici-
pality virtually unlimited authority to zone extraterritorially for the regional
public. Even so, because this proposal strikes at the very heart of the self
determination of local government, it will undoubtedly produce hard feel-
ings and serious conflict which can only minimize its effectiveness. All of
this would seem to indicate that extraterritorial land use regulation, however
structured, is not likely to provide an effective solution to the problem of
controlling regional land development."' The answer must lie elsewhere.
137. The foregoing problems of extraterritorial control of a metropolitan area are
not necessarily symptomatic of the deficiencies of regulation as a means for securing the
orderly and efficient development of a region. Similar problems are apt to arise with
respect to the use of the eminent domain power to implement a plan for ordered private
development; that is, by condemnation of certain developmental rights or the fee simple
itself. Assuming the formulation of a meaningful master plan for the metropolitan area,
which would be essential in the case of either regulation or condemnation, it seems un-
likely that one could escape the same kinds of jurisdictional and intergovernmental con-
fficts that plague extraterritorial zoning by the use of measures which compensate for the
restriction imposed. In fact, it would appear to be more difficult to obtain a regional
consensus to condemn than it would be to regulate. Condemnation involves a purchase
of private property. Though the taking is a compensatory one, it may entail the arbitrary
and total abolition of one's interest in property-something which can be expected to
arouse the emotions of a great many land owners. The prospect of one governmental
body owning, if only for a short time, land within another governmental unit is likely to
accentuate whatever friction might otherwise be expected in the event of extraterritorial
regulation. Also, the exercise of eminent domain involves a substantially greater expendi-
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Perhaps it lies in regional or metropolitan government vested with the power
to zone as well as plan. Or perhaps it lies in the use of local intraterritorial
zoning which must conform to a regional or metropolitan planY
ture of funds--a fact which is likely to obstruct both the adoption and administration of
such means of implementing a plan for the metropolitan area. And so the need for
centralization of authority and responsibility-metropolitan government-does not be-
come any less by the selection of other legal instrumentalities. Indeed there is no reason
to expect that there would be any marked diminution of the zealous preservation of the
local prerogative. Though the content and territorial scope of such exercise of the power
of eminent domain would no longer present the same questions of necessity and reason-
ableness, the constitutional issue would still remain in different form-is such taking for
a "public use." The "public use" requirement is currently in a state of flux. To the
extent that a state court is unwilling to equate it with a requirement of "public bene-
fit," regulation may be the only alternative where the land in question is not blighted.
Additionally, other problems raised with respect to extraterritorial zoning-regulation
without the consent of the governed, and the exclusion of incorporated communities-
are no less important, if not more significant, in the case of condemnation than in the
case of regulation.
Finally, although it is true that the effectuation of a regional master plan by the use
of eminent domain, however costly, appears on its face to require essentially a single act
of implementation, this does not mean that the orderly development of a region will re-
quire any less cooperation and collective effort. It is neither likely nor desirable that a
land use plan for the entire area be prescribed at once and once and for all. Continuous
administration and adjustment cannot and should not be avoided. A developmental
plan must take account of growth and changes in events and needs. Moreover, unless
the fee simple or developmental rights are leased, and this probably would not be
feasible or desirable, in the end regulation, and in particular zoning, must carry the
burden of enforcement. If the land is to be resold by a governmental body to a private
developer, then the constitutionality of the initial condemnation may depend upon the
kind of assurances present that the land will be devoted to the public purpose which
justified the exercise of the power of eminent domain. Restrictions in the deed itself
may be undesirable. If they create a defeasible fee simple, they may be ineffective be-
cause of the severity of the sanction. Financing would undoubtedly be hard to acquire.
If these restrictions take the form of a covenant they may be ineffective because they do
not permit sufficient supervision of the activities of a developer. Thus, since private
agreement may provide inadequate control over the developer's use of the land, it ap-
pears that the fulfillment of the public purpose must be achieved by supplemental land
use regulation. Indeed then, except for issues of constitutionality, the problems of achiev-
ing orderly regional development arising out of the use of eminent domain would be
virtually indistinguishable from those which inhere in the use of regulation.
138. One such solution has been offered by Pooley, who concludes:
That it is primarily the responsibility of the state governments to foster and sup-
port the proper planning of their urban areas, and that in carrying out this
responsibility the state must not shrink from making decisions which cannot prop-
erly be made by any one of the constituent municipalities. The state, for example,
should require, and not simply permit, the establishment of metropolitan planning
commissions for each metropolitan area within the state. This commission should,
again, be required to draw up a master plan for the development of the area as a
whole, and this plan should be given a legal status, in that it should be designated
as the yardstick by which the courts of the state are to judge the reasonableness
of the plans and plan enforcement techniques of the municipalities within the area.
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Thus Pooley recommends:
1. The present techniques of land use control are equal to the problems posed
by the rapid growth of metropolitan areas, provided that the state government is
prepared to accept its proper share of the responsibility for such areas. The recogni-
tion by the state government of this responsibility would involve, amongst other
things; a) the establishment of an adequately staffed state planning commission,
b) the establishment of metropolitan planning commissions in each metropolitan
area, and c) the establishment of metropolitan zoning boards of appeal.
4. The metropolitan planning commission should be required to draw up a mas-
ter plan for the development of the metropolitan area.
5. The metropolitan planning commission should consist of representatives or
appointees of the constituent municipalities and should have at least one repre-
sentative of the State, appointed by the Governor.
6. The local government units within a metropolitan area should be allowed to
retain the zoning power, but any zoning plan should be made in accordance with
the metropolitan master plan.
7. All land within a metropolitan area should be subject to planning and zoning
control.
8. The metropolitan board of zoning appeals should hear and decide all applica-
tions for variances or special exceptions within the metropolitan area. A vote in
excess of a simple majority should be required for the grant of a variance. The
intended scope of judicial review of the decisions of the board of zoning appeals
should be more carefully delineated than is at present the case, and the avenues
by which such review may be had should likewise be clearly described.
The board should in appropriate cases recommend amendments to the zoning
ordinance of any constituent local government unit. Any amendment of a zoning
ordinance should require more than a simple majority unless the approval of the
metropolitan planning commission has been first obtained. Id. at 122-23.
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